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Abstract
lbis dissertation investigates the relationship between corporate income tax rates
and inbound foreign direct investment in the United States. In the two essays presented,
the first estimates the effect of the corporate income tax rate on FDI inflows, while
controlling for other non-tax variables. The study uses time series data over the period
1957-2002 and employs cointegration techniques and error correction models to estimate
the long run and the short run tax responses. The corporate income tax rate is found to
exert a significant negative effect on total FDI inflows in the long run. A one percent
decrease in the tax rate will increase total FDI by 2.4 percent. The tax rate is also found to
exert significant negative effect on transfer funds in the long and short run. Tax rate
elasticities are larger in absolute value terms for the transfer funds than for total FDI. In
the long run, reinvested component of FDI is not responsive to the U.S. corporate income
tax rate.
The second essay investigates whether the corporate income tax rate is an
important detenninant of inbound FDI by incorporating both host country and home
country tax rates into the analysis. We find that inbound FDI shares a significantly
negative relationship with the host country corporate income tax rate, and a positive
relationship with the home country tax rates. This essay also examines whether investors'
decisions are affected differently by the various corporate taxation systems of the
investing countries. Findings suggest that investors from exemption countries are more
responsive to the U.S. corporate income tax rate than are those from tax credit countries.
However, the groups are not systematically different in their response to home country
corporate income tax rates.
iv
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Introduction

1

Considerable research effort has been devoted to identifying determinants of foreign
direct investment (FDI) in the United States. Interest in this area of research has been
stimulated by the unprecedented growth in FDI and by recognition of the importance FDI
holds for investment and growth in the host country. A number of empirical studies have
investigated the impacts of corporate income tax rates on FDI in the United States.
Although these studies have not reached an agreement regarding the relative responses of
individual FDI components to changes in tax· rates, there is a general consensus that FDI
is sensitive to changes in the corporate income tax rate. This finding has lead to concern
over the possibility of tax competition among countries to attract FDI. Governments
might enact tax policies to attract FDI inflows and to counter the threat of FDI outflows.
This dissertation investigates the role of corporate income tax rates on FDI in the
United States, while controlling for other important macroeconomic factors. There are
two closely related essays of this dissertation. The first essay revisits the time series
literature on taxation and aggregate FDI inflows in the United States. The second essay
examines the impacts of host country and home country corporate tax rate changes on the
amount of FDI flows into the United States.
Several features of the first essay represent improvements over earlier time series
studies to examine the responsiveness of FDI to changes in the corporate income tax rate.
First, this essay uses cointegration techniques to investigate the long run relationship
between tax rate and FDI. A single equation approach suggested by Engle and Granger
(1987) and multi-equation method proposed by Johansen (1991) are used to analyze
cointegration relationships. Second, this essay also estimates short run impacts of tax rate
changes on FDI. An error correction model is used to illustrate short run dynamics of the
2

variables. These relationships are examined for aggregated FDI as well as for
disaggregated components of FOi (transfer funds and reinvested funds).
The second essay uses panel estimation techniques to investigate the effects of
host country and home country tax policies on the amount of FDI flows into the United
States. This contributes to the literature by employing pooled estimation techniques such
as, fixed effects and random effects models to analyze possible relationship between
corporate tax rates and FDI inflows. This essay uses foreign direct investment data from
nine investing countries into the United States over 1982-2000 period. The study
investigates whether investors' decisions are affected by the various taxation systems
used in their own countries. We control for the different tax systems by including
countries that adopt tax credit system and countries that adopt tax exemption system. Our
sample consists of 4 tax credit countries and 5 tax exemption countries. We investigate
._I

whether results vary between tax credit countries and tax exemption countries.

3

Essay One
The Corporate Income Tax Rate and Foreign Direct Investment:
Time Series Evidence from the United States

4

Introduction

One of the most impressive economic developments since early 1970 has been the
increasing importance of foreign capital over domestic capital in the United States.
Foreign capital consists of two major components: Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), in
which investors wield substantial control over the management of invested capital, and
Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPI), in which such power is relatively minimal. Though
both types of investments have been on the rise over the last five decades, the former has
received more attention than the latter due to its stronger influence on the economy.
During the most part of the 20 th century, the U.S. was not considered a leading
destination for foreign direct investment. However, beginning in 1980, the United States
started to experience a remarkable increase in its FDI capital inflow and this trend
continued throughout the next two decades. To illustrate, annual US FDI inflows grew
from about $20 billion in 1980 to $294 billion in 1999. During this period, the annual
growth rate also showed an extraordinary upward trend. The annual growth rate of FDI
reached an astonishing 100 percent mark in 1983 and 1993. This trend helped the United
States surpass China to become the world's largest foreign direct investment recipient in
1992, and it was able to maintain this status until 2001 1 • According to the world
Investment Report (UNCTAD), the United States received approximately one third of
total world foreign direct investments in 1999. This surge has affected many other sectors
such as international trade, gross domestic product, and employment. For instance, sales

1

However, in 2002, US fel1 from its leading position and China regained its status as the major FDI
recipient attracting approximately $53 bil1ion.
5

by foreign-owned U.S. affiliates totaled $1717 billion in 1997.2 Further, US
affiliates employed approximately 5.2 million workers in the same year. This
unprecedented growth in FDI, and recognition of the importance that FDI holds for
investment and growth in the host country have stimulated a growing interest
especially among international and public policy oriented economists. A
considerable research effort has been devoted to identifying determinants of foreign
direct investment in the United States. Analyses have been conducted using both
time series and panel estimation techniques.
However, only a few studies have accounted for the impact of corporate
income tax policies even though a mere casual observation suggests a close a
relationship between the two variables. It is also consistent with the eclectic theory
(Dunning, 1981), which is arguably the most appealing model for understanding
foreign direct investment. It suggests that an investor take three factors into account
before undertaking an investment project in another country. They are the so-called
ownership advantage, location advantage, and internalization advantage. In
general, corporate taxes could affect all three of these conditions (Mooij and
Ederveen, 2001). Researchers, who favor this notion, are of the opinion that major
tax reform acts, such as TRA1986 have preceded the emergence of FDI inflows in
late 1980s.
Although these studies have not reached an agreement regarding the size of
the tax effect, there is a general consensus that FOi does respond to the corporate
income tax rate. This finding has led to concern over the possibility of tax
2

U.S. International Trade Commissions (2001).
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competition among countries to attract foreign capital in the form of FDI and to
counter the threat of FDI outflows. The ability of governments to use tax policies to
influence FDI flows will depend on the long run and short run responsiveness of
FDI to changes in the corporate income tax rate.
The major purpose of this essay is to revisit the time series literature on FDI
and corporate income taxation on FDI in the United States using modem time
series techniques. To my knowledge, the most recent time series study that uses the
U.S. data dates back to 1990 (Slemrod, 1990), and all of the exiting studies have
only used traditional time series methods for estimation and analysis.
This study makes at least two contributions. First, this makes use of the,
modem time series techniques to estimate the long run and short run tax rate
elasticity. It is important because a substantial improvement has occurred in the
,I

time series literature beginning in the late 1980s through most part of the 1990s.
Second, previous time series studies were unable to incorporate the most recent
FDI and corporate tax rate data into their analyses. Therefore, utilizing modem
estimation techniques along with a data set that spans nearly five decades will
broaden our understanding of the relationship between corporate income tax rate
and FDI in the United States.
Literature Review
An extraordinary surge in the FDI flows into the United States since late
1970s spurred unprecedented interest among researchers on the subject. However,
early time series studies on determinants of FDI did not include the tax rate as an
explanatory variable. Hartman (1984) is the first study to investigate the effects of
7

taxation on inbound FDI3 • Since Hartman, several well-known studies have been
undertaken on this issue. We could categorize them into two components: time series
studies and panel data studies. This section is confined to the time series literature by
leaving the discussion of panel studies to the second essay.
As suggested before, many agree that time series study on FDI and taxation
begins with Hartman (1984). Because virtually all of the subsequent studies have used
Hartman as the base line model, it is extremely important to understand the basic features
of this seminal paper in detail.
Motivation for the study came as a result of his investigation of 1981 tax reforms,
which was designed to accelerate rate of savings and rate of investments in the United
States. Hartman points out that savings and investment incentives did not only affect
domestic investors but also resulted in large increases in investments by foreigners. He
hypothesizes that investment incentives, which apply to both domestic and foreign
investors, may result in increased foreign investment in the United States. The standard
investment theories suggest that investors determine their capital investments according
to the value of real after tax rate of return on alternative investments. Using the FDI data
over the period of 1965-1979, Hartman estimates the model given in equation (1.1) to
understand the effect of tax policy on FDI in the United States.
(FDI)
,
[(1-t')]
In -- = a0 +a1 ln[r(l-t)] +a 2 ln[r (1-t) ] +a 3 ln -GNP
(1-t)

(I.I)

Here t measures the tax rate on U.S. capital owned by foreigners and t' denotes
the tax rate on U.S. capital owned by U.S. investors. Three types of rate of return
3

Detailed study on tax rates and FDI can be found in Hines (1997) and Mooij and Ederveen (2001).
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variables are used to explain the variance of FDI inflows in which all of them are
expressed in terms of rate of return variables. The first term, y(l-t) is the after tax rate of
return actually realized by foreign investors. This rate is included for capturing the tax
impact on foreign firms that are already in the business and are considering expansion of
current operations. The second term, y'( 1-t) estimates the overall gross rate of return on
capital in the United States. Hartman states that even though this term seems similar to
the first term, it serves a different purpose. In particular, second rate of return variable is
applicable to firms, which are acquiring existing assets. The third term, (1-t)/(1-t)
measures the tax rate on United States' capital owned by foreigners. This has also defined
as net of tax rate of return received by domestic investors relative to that received by
domestic investors on the same investment.
In short, after tax rate of return is meant to control for the expansion of c�rrent
corporations and the net after rate of return on gross capital represents for acquisition of
existing assets, while the relative term is included to capture the tax changes that
applicable only to the United States investors. Since the first two terms are expressed in
linear form he expects positive coefficients for the rates of return variables. A positive a 1
and a2 would support the hypotheses that United States taxes would have a negative
effect on foreign direct investments. Hartman expects to capture the valuation effect by
coefficient a3. In other words, he controls for the tax change that causes investments to
become more appealing to domestic investors but makes no change in cost to the foreign
· investors.
The role of home country taxes was ignored in his analysis because foreign
statutory corporate income tax rates have not varied much during the period. Hartman
9

further argues that home country taxes do not matter for the investments that come from
the tax exemption countries. Not every type of investment is affected even in the case of
investments from tax credit countries. As he argued, the home country taxes applied to
United States source income plays no role in the firm's marginal investment decisions.
Simply, only newly formed subsidiaries whose desired investment exceed earnings find
that tax rates on repatriation of earnings matter. Therefore Hartman does not expect any
detrimental effect on his results from this exclusion.
Hartman estimates two separate regressions: one for the reinvested earnings part
of investment (reinvested funds) and the other for the transfers from parent part of the
investments (transfer funds). According to the author, the reason behind this
categorization is that investment decisions of firms, which are reinvesting earnings at the
margin, could be affected differently by transfer funds. Since repatriated profit is taxed in
the home country, investors can decide to reinvest them rather than repatriati�g to the
parent company. This would allow the subsidiary to defer its tax obligations. Hence,
Hartman points out that United States tax impacts are different depending on whether the
funds are already in this country in the form of reinvested funds or they are in the
investing country in the form of transfer funds.
He further suggests that the difference may also depend on whether the firm is
established or an emerging at the time of investment decision is made. In general, mature
firms have sufficient funds to invest in the form of reinvested funds. However emerging
firms have to transfer new funds to their affiliates in the form of equities or loans. Hence
for mature firms, the home country tax rate should not play a significant role in their

10

investment decision. These considerations motivated Hartman to analyze reinvested
funds and transfer funds separately.
Hartman finds that both reinvested funds and transfer funds are significantly
correlated with the tax rates. However, he points out that reinvested funds have much
more explanatory power than that of transfer funds. To illustrate, while the former
explains more than 90 percent of the variation, the latter explains only 28 percent of the
total variation of the dependent variable. Hence, the author suggests that his model
should not be used for policy recommendation purposes, which involve transfers from
parent component of FDI. However Hartman concludes that in general, his model
provides strong evidence for the negative relationship between tax rates and foreign
direct investments in the United States.
Hartman's results were criticized on the grounds of a small sample size, omission
of control variables to represent non-tax effects, and an imperfect specification of the
model (Newlon 1987, Slemrod 1990). Several subsequent time series studies have been
undertaken as a result of their effort to minimize the shortcomings of Hartman's paper.
Boskin and Gale (1987) introduce several modifications into the Hartman
analysis. In particular, they update the series including FDI data until 1984 and use the
rate of return series calculated by Feldestein and Jun (1987) as explanatory variables.
Further, t�ey try a different specification instead of relying on standard double log
specification. For this purpose they estimate the model assuming both linear specification
as well as double log specification. However, these modifications have been unable to
produce significantly different qualitative results from those of Hartman. In other words,
they confirmed the basic Hartman conclusion that tax rate changes explain reinvested
11

earnings investment better than transfers from parent component of FDI. Nevertheless,
Boskin and Gale study emphasizes that results can still be somewhat sensitive to the form
of specification and size of the sample.
Newlon (1987) questions the validity of the data set that has used by Hartman
(1984) and Boskin and Gale (1987). He points out that both of the above studies have
miscalculated the rates of return data. Rates of returns were calculated by taking the ratio
of total earnings of foreign owned corporations over total invested capital. This
overestimates the rate of return data because total earnings consist of two components:
reinvested earnings and repatriations. He also observes a spurious relation of the rate of
return data. Newlon recalculates the rates of return data, but does not find a substantial
difference in the results of previous studies. However, he reports a slight change in the
explanatory power of the two equations due to this corrected series. While new data
explains transfer funds better, reinvested funds do not fit as well. Then Newlon estimates
transfer funds and reinvested funds equations for a longer data set from 1956 to 1984 and
finds that both models fit very poorly.
Young (1988) provides another time series analysis of the effects of domestic
taxes and rates of return on FDI in the United States. He mainly expands Hartman (1984)
analysis by using revised international investments and United States Gross National
Product data for a longer (1953-1984) period. Similar to previous studies he refers to FDI
as a financial transaction rather than real physical property and plant investments.
Further, as Hartman and others, he uses realized rate of return data though he admits that
expected rate of return data may be more relevant for the purpose.

12

The econometric model used by Young can be considered as a modified Hartman
model. It is written as in the equation (1.2).
(l�t')
ln(FDI)= a0 +a 1 ln[r(l-t)]+a 2 ln[r'(l-t)]+a3 ln[--] +a4 lnGNP+a5 lnFDI,_1

(1.2)

(1-t)

Notations are the same as in Hartman (1984) except there are two additional
regressors. GNP is included to control for the non-tax variables, while lag FDI term is
meant to capture short run variations. Specifically, if we restrict last two coefficients to
one and zero, respectively then this model is identical to Hartman (1984).
Previous studies added an arbitrary constant to the observed investment data to
construct log linear model. However, Young prefers to omit the observations with,
negative values and then proceeds to estimate log linear model. In 1974, the Bureau of
Economic Analysis the official data collection agency for foreign investments changed
._I

the definition of FDI. Young included a simple dummy variable to represent this change
but found the variable was statistically insignificant and hence dropped it from the final
specification.
Young compares results with those of earlier studies. In general, results are
similar to those of Hartman (1984) and Boskin and Gale (1987). However, he points out
that the results obtained by dropping negative values are much better than results derived
using constructed values that have obtained by adding arbitrary constant to all
observations. According to Young, an insignificant and small value of the estimated
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable indicates that the adjustment process is
immediate.

13

Empirical results for transfer funds are extremely poor. The model is not able to
explain even a quarter of the variation of the dependent variable. Hence, he questions the
ability to use tax variables to explain FDI inflows in the United States because transfer
funds themselves contributed approximately 60 percent of the total FDI inflows at the
time of his study. However, Young's results suggest that if one wan.ts to focus only on
reinvested funds, then he or she can satisfactorily use the Hartman analysis to understand
the taxation and FDI issue.
Based on his regression results, Young reports a higher (-1.81) tax rate elasticity
for FDI through reinvested earnings, and a lower (-0.47) elasticity for FDI through
transfers from parent component of FDI than do earlier studies. This study also indicates
that tax incentives generated by the 1981/1982 tax reforms have increased FDI in the
United States substantially.
Murthy (1989) points out that Young's regression results are quite misleading due
to the presence of autocorrelation between the residuals in the time series data. Murthy
re-estimates Young's model to adjust for the presence of autocorrelation. Specifically, he
uses a maximum likelihood estimation instead of Ordinary Least Squares. Applying
various types of tests such as Durbin h-test, Durbin m-test and Lagrange multiplier test he
rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
Murthy describes two possible ways to correct for the autocorrelation problem.
One is t.o use the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure and the other is to use maximum likelihood
estimation. However, Murthy explains that the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is not
advisable here because Young's model includes a lagged dependent variable as an
explanatory variable. This will lead to inconsistent and sometimes biased estimates. On
14

the other hand, maximum likelihood estimators are consistent in larger samples and are
more efficient than the ordinary least squares estimators.
Although the general findings are quite similar, the overall tax rate elasticity in
Murthy (1989) is much larger than Young's (1988) elasticity. To illustrate, the long run
tax rate elasticity for the reinvested funds in Murthy is -0.7, while Young's estimate is
- 0.32. The same is true for the short run elasticities. However, Murthy' s results seem
statistically superior to those of Young due to several reasons. First, standard errors are
smaller. Second, adjusted R2 is slightly higher. Third, most of the coefficients have the
expected sign. Unlike reinvested funds, results based on transfer funds are not
comparable between two studies. For instance, Murthy emphasizes that long term overall
tax rate responses for transfer funds are elastic while Young maintains that they are
inelastic.
Arguably, after Hartman, the most important time series studies on taxation and
foreign direct investment is Slemrod (1990). It is worthwhile to have a fair amount of
discussion about his methodology and results. Slemrod criticizes the earlier results in the
literature for several reasons and introduces some modifications to improve the results.
First, he suggests that since FOi data consist of measurement error we have to
correct for them before we undertake any kind of estimation. Measurement error occurs
due to the way the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) collects data. BEA collects data
using benchmark surveys. This method of collection is likely to make more errors when
farther away from the benchmark years. To control for this data discrepancy he includes a
drift term, which is equal to the number of years elapsed since the previous benchmark
survey of FOi conducted by the BEA. Second, improvement is also related to the data
15

definition issue. It is known that the BEA changed the definition of FDI in 1974.
According to the change, minimum ownership requirement that needs to be considered as
FDI was decreased from 25 percent to IO percent. Previous studies except Boskin and
Gale (1987), have not taken this into consideration when they estimate the model. In
order to account for this, Slemrod includes a dummy variable for post 1974 observations.
Third, he uses marginal effective tax rates that were derived by Auerbach and Hines
(1988) to estimate tax coefficients. Fourth, he introduces some non-tax variables such as
relative gross national product, unemployment rate of prime age males, and real exchange
rate into the analysis. Fifth, he uses lagged tax term as an explanatory variable in his
estimation. According to Slemrod, because of the time it takes to implement an
investment decision, there may be a lag between changes in the tax rate on FDI.
With all these adjustments, he finds completely opposite results from those of
Hartman and previous researchers. In other words, Slemrod finds that only transfer fund�
are significantly negatively correlated with tax rates. Results do not suggest a negative
association between tax rates and retained earnings. Rather he finds a positive
relationship between these two variables. He does not provide any reason for the
significantly positive correlation between corporate income tax rate and reinvested funds.
Although the inclusion of non-tax variables improves the explanatory power of the
model, he finds that the unemployment rate, the ratio of gross national product, and drift
variables are not significantly different from zero.
In the second part of the paper, Slemrod separates total FDI in the United States
by investing country and controls for the tax system in the home country of the parent
company. He expects that investors from tax exemption countries respond differently
16

than those from tax credit countries. He uses only statutory corporate income tax rates for
the tax variables. However, outcomes of the regression do not provide convincing
evidence to support the hypothesis. Surprisingly, his regression results on FDI using
manufacturing sector investments indicate a significantly negative relationship with tax
rates only for investments by United Kingdom and Japan, which adopt tax credit system.
Most of the results in the latter part of the Slemrod study can be described as mixed
rather than clear-cut results.
While exiting studies largely agree on a negative correlation between corporate
tax rates and FDI in the United States, they have not reached an agreement regarding the
size of the tax effect. After reviewing the exiting literature, Hines (1997) finds that the
tax rate elasticity is between -0.5 and -0.6. However, Mooij and Ederveen (2001)
suggest that the mean value of the tax rate elasticity is considerably larger than that of
Hines.
Their calculation is based on a meta analysis of 25 published and unpublished
studies on corporate taxation and FDI. Meta analysis refers to a statistical analysis from
individual studies. It goes beyond a regular survey of the literature because it takes into
account the underlying differences in study characteristics. This type of study is
particularly useful for a review of FDI and corporate taxation literature for several
reasons.
First, the dependent variable is not the same in every study. As we have seen,
researchers have expressed FDI as a ratio of some form of macroeconomic
variablesWhen the dependent variable is different, it is not recommended to use
coefficient of determ�nation to compare studies. Second, different studies use different
17

specifications, sample size, and non-tax variables. While some studies, such as Hartman's
completely ignored non-tax variables, others (Slemrod, 1990) have controlled for some
non-tax effects.
In order to address these differences Mooij and Ederveen calculate the tax rate
elasticity for some well-known studies under a uniform definition. Equation (1.3)
displays the regression equation in their study.
y = BX +E

(1.3)

where y represents the vector of elasticities and X is a matrix of dummy variables
to control for different study characteristics. The semi-elasticity is defined as the
percentage change in FDI in response to a one- percentage point change in tax rates. They
provide a convenient way of transforming semi-elasticity into an ordinary elasticity. The
ordinary elasticity is measured as the impact on FDI due to a one-percent change in the
tax rate, while semi-elasticity measures the impact on FDI to a one-percentage point
change in the tax rate.
They conclude that the absolute mean value of the tax rate elasticity is quite
large. To illustrate, the study suggests that one- percent reduction in the host country
corporate income tax rate raises FOi in that country by 3.3 percent. Table 1.1 shows
median and mean tax rate elasticity for some well-known time series studies on taxation
and foreign direct investment. A good understanding about the tax rate elasticity is
important because it has important welfare implications for an economy. Young (1988)
provides a very good explanation of the welfare effects. Welfare effects associated with
the impact of a tax change on FDI can be measured by studying the impacts on tax
revenue. Theoretically, an increase in the tax rate will increase tax revenue provided tax
18

Table 1.1
Tax Rate Elasticities
Study
Hartman (1984)
Boskin and Gale (1987)
Newlon (1987)
Young (1988)
Murthy (1989)
Slemrod (1990)

a

Median
Semi-Elasticity
-3.5
-2.7
-0.4
-2.1
-0.7
-3.5

Mean
Semi-Elasticity
-2.6
-5.8
-0.4
-1.1
-0.6
-5.5

,

a

a1nFDI
ainFDI
. . =
ElastlClty
. . =
Seml. - ElastlClty
TAXRATE
lnTAXRATE

Source: Mooij and Ederveen (2001)
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rates are inelastic. Since tax rate in the United States seems elastic, a reduction of the tax
rate should increase tax revenue. Therefore, studies that estimate tax rate elasticities are
useful for designing a tax policy that aims to enhance the welfare of the United States.

Contribution
There are two purposes of this study. The first is to investigate both long run and
short run relationships between corporate income tax rates and FDI in the United States.
A single equation based cointegration approach, suggested by Engle and Granger (1987),
and multi-equation method of Johansen (1991) are used to analyze the long run
relationship between tax rates and FDI. We distinguish between long run and short run
tax effects by estimating an error correction model. This distinction is important because
multinational investors generally do not respond to tax rate changes until they are assured
that changes would not be reversed in a short period of time. The existence of a
cointegration relationship would enable us to calculate both short run and long run tax
rate elasticities. Findings can be compared with studies that have used traditional time
series techniques.
The second purpose is to determine whether different components of FDI respond
differently to corporate income tax rate changes. Empirical studies distinguish between
FDI that is financed by reinvested funds and transfer funds. Previous studies are not in
agreement regarding the relative responsiveness of FDI components to corporate income
tax rate changes. For example, Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987), Murthy (1989),
and Young (1988) suggest that FDI from reinvested funds are more responsive to taxes
than FDI financed by transfer funds. Slemrod (1990) and Cassou (1997) find the reverse
to hold.
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Several features of the present study represent improvements over earlier attempts
to examine the responsiveness of FDI to changes in corporate income tax rates. First, this
study uses modern time series techniques to identify effects of tax rates on FDI. Most
importantly, we examine stationarity and cointegration properties of the series. As
Granger and Newbold (1974) have shown, spurious results are often obtained when
nonstationary variables are used to estimate a long run relationship. However, it is still
possible to find a meaningful long run relationship with non-stationary time series
variables if at least one cointegration relationship exists among the variables (Engle and
Granger 1987). To our knowledge, previous studies have not used these techniques to
estimate the effects of tax rates on FDI.
Second, this study estimates short run dynamics of impacts of tax changes on FDI. An
Error Correction Model (ECM) is used to illustrate short run dynamics of the mod�l. This
approach will enable us to gather information about the length of time that foreign
investors take to respond to changes in corporate tax rates and other control variables. In
other words, adjustment parameter provides information about the length of time it takes
to re-establish the long run equilibrium after a shock to the model. Furthermore, the
existence of an ECM can be used to confirm the long run equilibrium relationship among
the variables.
A third improvement pertains to the type of corporate tax rate used to estimate the
tax rate elasticity. Previous time series studies generally use some form of an effective
marginal corporate income tax rate, while we use the statutory corporate tax rate. The
effective marginal tax rate is commonly interpreted as a forward-looking measure of
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investment incentives. According to Mackie (2002), this tax rate is a hypothetical tax
rate that measures capital costs attributed to taxes on marginally profitable investments.
Methods used to calculate effective tax rates are rather subjective because they involve
assumptions regarding the inflation rate, depreciation rate, and so on. When estimating
the real tax burden, effective tax rates should be used rather than statutory tax rates. Our
purpose is to understand how foreign direct investors respond to changes in tax rates.
Policymakers and investors probably know little about effective tax rates and base their
decisions on statutory corporate income tax rates. Employing statutory tax rates will
enable us to construct a data set spanning five decades to capture more variation in tax
rates and FOi. This study would enable us to compare our findings with those based on
effective marginal corporate income tax rates.
Finally, we employ a larger sample size than used in earlier studies. Tax and FOi
data for the period 1957-2002 will capture tax policy changes for five decades. Previous
studies have used samples ranging shortest from 1965 to 1979 (Hartman 1984) and
longest from 1953 to 1987 (Slemrod 1990). We also account for other important
determinants of FOi such as the real minimum wage, imports, gross domestic product,
and effective exchange rates. By capturing more variation over time and controlling for a
variety of other FDI determinants, we expect to obtain more precise estimates of the tax
rate elasticities.
Empirical Strategy

We use the same specification that has been used in the FOi and taxation
literature to investigate the issue. In other words, this study investigates the relationship
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between natural logarithm of FDI and natural logarithm of statutory federal corporate
income tax rate (CITR) and other control variables. We apply modem time series
techniques to analyze the following issues:
1. Investigate whether a long run relationship exits between foreign direct
investment and corporate income tax rate in the United States.
2. Determine if the different components of FDI respond differently to the
changes in corporate income tax rate.
3. Investigate the short run dynamics of the model. More specifically, examine if
corporate tax rate changes incur any significant short run impacts on the
amount of inbound FDI to the United States.
It is standard in the time series literature to check for the unit roots in each series
before estimating any equation. If there is a unit root, that series is considered to be non
stationary because then it contains a stochastic component. Granger and Newbold (1974)
point out that estimation based on non-stationary variables may lead to what they called
spurious results. A spurious regression has a high R2 and t-statistics that appear to be
significant, but the results are without any economic meaning (Enders, 2003). Following
this guidance, this study begins the estimation procedure assessing the properties of each
variable to determine if any of them are non-stationary.
Although non-stationary variables can lead to spurious results, it is possible to
obtain a linear combination of integrated variables ·that is stationary. Such a relationship
is called a cointegration equation in the time series literature. A cointegration equation
suggests a long run equilibrium relationship between the variables that move together.
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Two methods are currently available for identifying cointegration relationships: Engle
Granger cointegration test (1987) and a Johansen (1991) cointegration test. We use both
of them even though Engle and Granger results are analyzed in greater detail.
This study uses data that spans five decades. It is possible that some series have
undergone permanent shifts during this period. Results could be misleading if we do not
take structural breaks into account. It is especially so because some unit root tests such as
Dickey-Fuller do not account for breaks in the series. This may have serious
consequences because it generally leads to acceptance of the null of unit root in the series
against the alternative. Hence, we use Chow test to identify any structural break in the
series and then cointegration relationships are re-estimated with any possible break.
Last step of the empirical method is to estimate the short run relationship between
the variables under consideration. Here we specifically use the Error Correction Model .

1

(ECM) suggested by Engle and Granger (1987). The short run model serves several
important purposes. First, it can be used to identify whether the tax effects are permanent
or temporary. If tax responses are significant in the short run only, then the impacts of the
changes in tax rates are temporary. On the other hand, if responses in both long and short
run are significant, then we will have both transitory and permanent effects. Second,
ECM can be used to confirm the outcomes of the cointegration equation. According to
the Granger Representation Theorem, for any integrated of order one, I (1) variables,
error correction and cointegration are equivalent representations (Enders, 2003). Finally,
ECM provides information about the speed of adjustment in response to a deviation from
the long run equilibrium, which can be very useful for the policy analysis.
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Data Definitions and Sources
This paper examines the inbound FOi flows for the US economy over the period
1957-2002. Annual data for FOi and other explanatory variables are needed for
estimating the models outlined in the previous section. Following the literature, I rely on
the FDI data provided by the BEA. It provides total FDI data, which includes reinvested
earnings by subsidiaries of foreign parents and transfer funds from the parent company to
the US firms. FDI data pertaining to the 1957-1987 period are obtained from Young
(1988) while data for the other years are drawn from various issues of the Survey of
Current Business, which is published by the BEA. Figures on total foreign direct

investment (FOi) transfer funds (TFDI) and reinvested funds (RFOI) are expressed in
millions of US dollars. TFDI and RFDI cover the period 1957-1999 while FDI covers a
slightly longer period 1957-2002.
In order to assess tax responses, the top corporate income tax rate (CITR) is used.
Only federal corporate income tax rates are utilized and hence no inferences should be
deduced regarding the state corporate income tax impacts on inbound FOi. CITR data
are obtained from the various issues of US Master Tax Guide. Following Slemrod (1990),
one-year lag corporate income tax rate is also used as an explanatory variable in this
study.
The series for gross domestic product (GDP) and prime interest rate (INT) have
been collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis's FRED II database. GDP are
provided in real terms using 1996 dollars while nominal interest rate variable is expressed
in terms of percentages.
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Data for the other control variables are obtained from several different sources.
For instance, total annual US imports (IMPORT) are directly from the Council of
Economic Advisers' Economic Report of the President, February 2003 issue while real

minimum wage rate (MWR) data are extracted from the mimimumwage.com web site4 •
Source for the effective exchange rate (EEXR) data is the various issues of International
Financial Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund. EEXR data are based

on 1995. A decrease in this index reflects a real depreciation of the US dollar.
Unit Root Tests

There are several tests available to determine if any series are stationary or
whether the series contain a unit root. We utilize the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) and Phillips-Perron (PP) test (Phillips-Perron, 1988) in this
study. Under both of these tests, the null hypothesis is the existence of unit root.
Therefore, an acceptance of the null means the series is non-stationary. General structure
of the ADF equation is given in equation (1.4).
(1.4)

!!:..y, = µ+ yt+t5Y,-1 + �!!:..Y,-1 +£,
i=k

Three different specifications of ADF tests are available. The first specification
excludes both trend and intercept terms in which, both µ and y are restricted to zero. The
second specification includes intercept but excludes trend term, so only y is restricted to
zero. The third one includes both trend and intercept term. The ADF test is an
improvement of the original Dickey-Fuller unit root test (DF). Unlike ADF, DF assumes
4

http://www.minimumwage.com
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that the errors are independent and have a constant variance. However, if the true data
generating process contain an autoregressive component, we may not be able to obtain
proper estimates using DF unit root test. So, ADF test controls for possible higher order
lags including k lags of first differences of the dependent variable to the right hand side
of the equation.
Therefore, one of most important steps of the ADF test is to select the appropriate
lag length. As Enders (2003) points out, too few lags mean that the residuals do not
behave like a white-noise process. Including too many lags reduce the power of the test to
reject the null of a unit root because more lags lead to loss of degrees of freedom. There
are several methods available for selecting the appropriate lag length. Here we use two of
the most popular tests: Akaike Information Criterion (AIC, 1974) and Schwarz Bayesian
Information Criterion (SBC, 1978). AIC and SBC are computed using the form of
equations (1.5) and (1.6) respectively.

AIC = -2LIT + 2K IT

(1.5)

SBC= -2LIT + 2K(logT)/T

(1.6)

Lis the value of the maximized value of log likelihood, K is the lag length, and T
is the number of observations. Adding any lag has an advantage and a disadvantage. It
will decrease the value of the first term of AIC, but increase the value of the second term.
So, adding an additional lag continues until the marginal cost equals marginal benefit of
doing so. In other words, the appropriate lag length is chosen such that AIC achieves its
minimum value. SBC has the same strategy, but imposes a larger penalty for including
additional variables. Such a penalty system causes SBC to select a more parsimonious
model than the AIC. However, AIC in general is better for small samples whil� SBC is
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superior for large samples. Since these two methods have produced contradictory results
regarding the optimal lag length, this study arbitrarily uses one lag for testing unit roots.
It is not uncommon to use only one lag in annual data. Results indeed show that the errors
obtained from each unit root test are white noise suggesting that one lag is sufficient to
approximate the true data generating process.
The PP test is different from ADF unit root test because it controls for the
autocorrelation to represent true data generating process better.. It omits the lagged first
difference terms and undertakes a non-parametric correction to the t statistics. Both the
ADF and PP methods test the null hypothesis of a unit root in the series. Throughout this
study, the Newey-West (1987) procedure is used for estimating the equations because it
gives a more consistent covariance estimator in the presence of unknown
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The results of both unit root tests are given in
Table 1.2. Results clearly indicate a unit root in each series suggesting they are non
stationary. On the other hand ADF and PP tests for the first differences of the variables as
given in Table 1.3 show that they are stationary. Existence of a unit root in each variable
requires us to test for the cointegration because it is still possible to have a long run
equilibrium relationship between the variables in spite of this non-stationarity problem.
Cointegration Test: Engle and Granger Approach

Though the variables themselves are non-stationary, it is possible to have a linear
combination of integrated variables that is stationary. In time series literature, such
variables are called cointegrated variables. There are several alternative ways to test for
cointegration. This study uses the most popular Engle and Granger (1987) procedure as
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Table 1.2
Unit Root Tests
Variables in Levels
Variable

ADP Test Statistic

PP Test Statistic

5% CV=-3.52

5% CV=-3.52

Reinvested Funds
Transfer Funds

-1.49
-1.86

-2.22
2. 61

Total FDI

-3.10

-2.71

CITR

-3.10

-2.32

GDP

-0.59

-0.58

IMPORTS

1.35

0. 42

MWR

-3.06

-2.72

INT

-2.31

-1.86

EEXR

-3.31

-2.37

Note: ADP and PP test the null of a unit root. One lag is used in both
tests. Results are reported for constant and trend specification only.
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Table 1.3
Unit Root Tests
Variables in First Differences
Variable

ADF Test Statistic

PP Test Statistic

5% CV=-3.52

5% CV=-3.52

Reinvested Funds

-4.93

-7.77

Transfer Funds
Total FDI

-7.58

CITR

-5.56
-4.62
-5.57

-5.54
-4.27

GDP

-6.58

-6.37

IMPORTS

-3.76

-6.30

MWR

-4.31

-6.64

INT

-4.46

-5.34

EEXR

-4.35

-4.22

Note: ADF and PP test the null of a unit root. One lag is used in both
tests. Results are reported for constant and trend specification only.
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the primary test. However, a Johansen test for cointegration (Johansen, 1991) is also used
to confirm the primary results. Single equation based Engle and Granger approach
defines the cointegration as follows.
Suppose there are two time series Yt and Xt that are both integrated of order d and
denoted by, I (d). If there exits a vector�' such that the disturbance from the regression is
of a lower order of integration, I (d-b), where b>O, then Engle and Granger (1987) define
y1 and x1 as cointegrated of order d and b (Harris and Sollis, 2003). In this study, since all
the variables are I (1), the series would be cointegrated if the disturbance term from the
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is integrated of order zero, I (0). T�ere are two important
steps in this test. First, we estimate the best possible linear equation for total FOi and two
other components of FDI using OLS to capture the residuals. Then ADF and PP tests are
used to test whether residuals contain a unit root. If the residuals do not contain a unit
root, we determine that the cointegration relationship exists and continue with the long
run analysis. The cointegration equations are given in equations (1.7), (1.8), and (1.9),
respectively.
FDI, =Po+P1 CITR, + LP;X, +E,

(1.7)

i=2

TFDI, = Po + P1 CITR, +

L pi x, + E,
7

i=2
7

RFD], =Po+ fi1 CITR, + LP;X, + E,

(1.8)
(1.9)

i=2

FOi, TFOI, and RFOI denote total foreign direct investment, transfer funds and
reinvested funds respectively and X represents non-tax explanatory variables. In order to
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test for whether the above three equations represent any long run equilibrium
relationship, we use the ADF test. However, Engle and Granger (1987) advocate ADF of
the form given in equation (1.10).

fl.e = 1?e,_1 +

L 1//;8.e,_; + µ + ci + (,
i=l

(, - IID(O, u

2

)

(1.10)

Where, e1 are the residuals from the cointegration equations. In this test we assume
that µ and cS are zero because we have already included deterministic components of
constants and trend terms in the cointegration equations. Deterministic components can
be added to either the long run equation or error term equation, but not to both (Harris
and Sollis, 2003).
Empirical Long Run Results

Table 1.4 presents results of the cointegration relationship for all three types of
foreign direct investments separately. Table 1.5 gives ADF and PP unit root test results
for the residuals. Results indeed suggest that the variables share a long run equilibrium
relationship in each equation. Since there are three foreign direct investment equations in
this study, discussion of results is carried out in the order in which they appear in the
Table 1.4: total FDI, transfer funds, and reinvested funds, respectively.
Column 2 of Table 1.4 presents results of the cointegration relationship between
total FDI and the explanatory variables. As expected, the corporate tax rate exerts a
significant negative effect on FDI inflows to the United States. Results suggest that a
one- percent decrease in the corporate tax rate would increase total FDI in the U.S. by 2.4
percent. This finding is similar to those of other studies shown in Table 1.1. The
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Table 1.4
Engle and Granger Cointegration Results
Variable

Total FDI

Transfer
Funds

Constant

-56.2568

-24.065c

-62.332

(11.600)

(13.566)

(47.144)

CITR

-2.425

c

-4.220

a

Reinvested Funds

1.698

(1.246)

(1.415)

(2.496)

3.2813

3.090c

5.098

(l.164)

(1.719)

(1.922)

5.8133

2.180

5.473

(l.341)

(1.428)

(4.297)

1.6378

1.422

0.537

(0.434)

(0.617)

(1.011)

-l.107c

-1.363

0.804

(0.646)

(0.856)

(0.798)

0.7413

0.8388

-0.038

(0.202)

(0.258)

(0.361)

-0.022

1.279

-0.450

(0.771)

(1.154)

(1.492)

Adjusted R2

0.978

0.967

0.265

Durbin-Watson

2.220

2.019

1.663

CITR1-1
GDP
IMPORTS
MWR
INT
EEXR

b

b

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 8Significant at the 1% level.
Significant at the 5% level. cSignificant at the 10% level. Linear and nonlinear time trend are also included as explanatory variables in the
regression. Variables are in natural logs.

b
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Table 1.5
Unit Root Tests: Error Term
Variable

ADF Test Statistic

PP Test Statistic

5% CV=-2.93

5% CV=-2.93

Errors of reinvested Funds

-6.09

-7.58

Errors of transfer Funds

-5.48

-5.03

Errors of total FDI

-4.83

-6.44

Note: ADF and PP test the null of a unit root. One lag is used in ADF and 3
lags are used in PP test. Results are for no constant and no trend
specification only.
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similarity of tax rate elasticities across studies suggests tax rates used in these studies are
highly correlated. Using the statutory corporate tax rate in the place of the effective
corporate tax rate results in an elasticity that is similar to the average value of the
elasticities shown in Table 1.1. This is consistent with the literature. Mooij and Ederveen
(2001) find that studies using marginal effective tax rates yield higher elasticities than
studies that adopt statutory tax rates. More important message is that corporate tax rate
changes can have a significant long run effect on the amount of inbound FDI of the
United States. This is a critical finding because the majority of studies on the
determinants of FDI completely ignore the tax effects. The validity of those studies can
be questioned on the ground of omitted variable bias.
Although we are primarily interested in the relationship between the current
corporate tax rate and FDI, it is interesting to note that the coefficient on the lagge'd tax
rate variable is positive and significant. This is consistent with Slemrod's (1990)
findings. 5 Interpreting the coefficient of lag tax rate requires assuming that all the other
variables including current tax rate remains unchanged. An increase in the lagged
corporate tax rate implies a relatively smaller current rate, which should attract more FDI.
On the other hand, a decrease in lagged tax rate, holding current tax rate constant implies
a relative increase in current rate, which should reduce FDI inflows. Therefore, a positive
relationship between lag tax rate and FDI is quite understandable and statistically
consistent.

5 Slemrod (1990) finds the one-year lag corporate tax rate elasticity is 4.28 for the 1960-1987 period.
Elasticities are found to differ considerably across specifications and time periods.
35

GDP and FDI are positively and significantly related in the long run. GDP
appears to be one of the most important determinants of FDI. This is particularly true for
the U.S. because it has the largest domestic market of any country. This proves largely
accepted market size hypothesis regarding determinants of FOi. It says that foreign
investors take into account the size of the host country market when. they make
investment decisions. The theoretical foundation for this argument can be traced back to
Balassa (1966). Producing in a larger market will enable investors to exploit economies
of scale and also achieve higher sales. Casual observation of the GDP and FDI series
alone would confirm this finding. In the late l 990s when the economy was growing at a
very healthy rate the U.S. experienced a huge increase in FDI inflows. Figure I.I and 1.2
illustrate this close relati9nship growth rate of FDI and that of GDP over the last five
decades.
The factor endowment approach to the determinants of FDI implies that FDI
generally flows from one country to another because the former has a comparative
disadvantage in the relevant industry. Due to its larger market, imports are a particularly
important determinant of FDI for the United States. However, whether trade encourages
FDI is still an unanswered question. Some view FDI as an alternative to trade. So, foreign
companies that export goods and services to the U.S. may sometimes find it is more
profitable to produce within market rather than exporting them. This generally happens
after they establish their product with the domestic consumers. Producing in the foreign
country can be a strategy to circumvent trade barriers such as tariffs, quantitative
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restrictions, and dumping duties. A good example is Honda's establishment of production
facilities in Ohio to circumvent the tariffs and voluntary export restraints imposed by the
U.S. (Moosa, 2002). However, some empirical studies have found a positive relationship
between FDI and trade, suggesting they are working as complements rather than as
substitutes to each other.
This study finds a significantly positive long run relationship between U.S.
imports and inbound FDI. Complementarity between FDI and trade arises from a variety
of sources. U.S. affiliates' sales and U.S. imports both deliver foreign goods and services
to U.S. consumers. Foreign goods are important inputs into affiliate manufacturing.
Greater sales in foreign markets will require improved distribution systems, advertising,
and R&D activities that are facilitated by FDI inflows. Further, this result is in line with
the recent studies on FDI (Billington, 1999).
Results also reveal a positive relationship between the interest rate and FDI. We
hypothesized that FDI and interest rates would be negatively correlated. Cost of capital is
one of the most important determinants of any type of investments regardless of whether
they come from foreign or domestic sources. The interest rate can be considered as a
good proxy for the cost of capital. The differential rates of return hypothesis suggest that
international capital flows from one country to another until all rates of return advantages
are exhausted. Earlier studies such as Hartman (1984) and Young (1988) have not used
the interest rate as an explicit variable. However, studies that use statutory corporate
income tax rates for representing tax impacts choose to include the interest rate explicitly
into the model (Billington, 1999). Billington also reports a positive coefficient for the
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import variable. Increased inbound FDI can be associated with higher U.S. interest rates
when multinationals borrow in the source country rather than in the United States.
Specifically, higher interest rate in the U.S. encourages foreign investors to borrow from
the home country capital market and invest in the U.S., which suggest a direct
relationship between the two variables.
The real minimum wage rate is included to control for the cost of labor in the host
country. Differences in wages can cause significant location-related differences in the
costs of production. The theoretical foundation is provided by eclectic theory (Dunning,
1981) as well by the location hypothesis developed by Horst (1972). Studies that
empirically test for the wage effect oftentimes include unit labor cost to represent wage
differentials and find a negative relationship betw�en labor cost and FDI inflows
(Cushman 1987, Chakraborty and Basu 2002). The real minimum wage is better suited
to represent wage impacts and this is the first known study that includes it as an
explanatory variable. Results indicate a significantly negative relationship at 10 percent
level confirming the findings of existing literature.
The currency area hypothesis implies that the foreign exchange rate can be
significant variable for determining inbound FDI. However, the exchange rate can affect
FDI in different ways. If the investor targets the host country market, then appreciation of
local currency would lead to increase in FDI inflows. On the other hand, if the investor
were planning to export its product, then depreciation of the host country exchange rate
would encourage FDI. Froot and Stein (1991) suggest that the depreciation of the United
States' dollar after 1985 had been the major reason for the unprecedented increase in FDI
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inflows into the United States in late 1980s. The effective exchange rate is included in
this study to test the currency area hypothesis. Results fail to establish any significant
relationship between the two variables. Though surprising, this finding is consistent with
some well-known studies (Slemrod, 1990).
Cointegration results for transfer funds are shown in Column 2 of Table 1.4.
Transfer funds and the corporate income tax rate display a significant negative long run
relationship. This relationship is stronger than the total FDl-tax relationship discussed
earlier. Currently, transfer funds account for more than 90 percent of total FDI flows. The
corporate tax rate elasticity for transfer funds of -4.22 is considerably larger than the -2.4
value reported for total FDI. Once again, the coefficient on the lagged tax rate variable is
positive and significant. Coefficients on imports and the interest rate are positive and
significant, as is the case with total FDI. Time displays a positive and significant non
linear trend and a negative and significant linear trend with transfer funds. Our
specifications for total FDI and transfer funds result in much higher coefficients of
determination (adjusted R2) than that reported by other studies.
Results in the final column of Table 1.4 pertain to reinvested funds. The
coefficient on the current tax rate is not significant. These findings counter results
reported by Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987), Murthy (1989), and Young (1988),
but are consistent with findings of Slemrod (1990) and some panel studies (Cassou,
1997). Once again, the coefficient on the lagged tax rate is positive and significant. None
of the other key determinants exert significant effects on reinvested funds. Time has a
positive non-linear relationship with reinvested funds.
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Slemrod (1990) and the present study find the tax rate is an important determinant
of transfer funds, but not reinvested funds. Earlier time series studies find that the
opposite holds. The changing composition of FDI flows might account for the different
findings reported by these studies. During the 1953-1968 period, reinvested funds
accounted for more than 50 percent of total FDI in the United States. The share of FDI
attributed to reinvested funds has fallen over time. By 1999, reinvested funds accounted
for about 7 percent of total FDI. Studies that include at least two or more non-tax
variables find transfer funds are responsive to tax rates while reinvested funds are not. It
is possible that when non-tax variables are dropped from the regression, the coefficients
could capture the responses of those omitted variables distorting the pure tax responses.
Later, we conduct robustness tests such as regression specification and structural break
tests to investigate why studies result in different tax elasticities for the various
component of FDI.
As previously stated, this essay relies on the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure
to analyze cointegration relationships between corporate income tax rate and various
components of FDI. Although this is the most popular and one of the easiest methods to
apply, it has several limitations. The test requires considering one variable as the
dependent variable and the others as explanatory variables. However, it is possible to find
that one regression indicates that the variables are cointegrated, whereas reversing the
order indicates no cointegration (Enders, 2003). Another disadvantage of the procedure is
that it ignores the possibility of more than one cointegration relationship. When there are
more than two variables in the model, there can be more than one-cointegration
41

relationship. Specifically, if there are n variables, it is possible for up to n-1 cointegration
vectors to exist in the model. Single equation based Engle and Granger procedure
produces inefficient results if there are more than one-cointegration relationships. Hence,
it is necessary to check for potential multi-cointegration vectors using alternative
cointegration tests. The following section uses the Johansen (1991) procedure to
investigate this matter. This procedure allows for,inore than one cointegration vector,
preventing any efficiency loss.
Johansen Cointegration Test

This procedure uses two methods to determine the number cointegrating vectors
in a system. They are the so-called eigenvalue test and trace test. Both methods rely on
the Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to reach conclusions. The general form of the
VAR representation is given by the equation (1.11) and (1.12).
x, = J\x,_1 + .Aix,_2 + .... + Apx,_P + E,

(1.11)

p -l

ta, = nx,_1 + Ln,. t:a,_; + E,

(1.12)

i=l

where

1l

= -(] - :t �) and 1l; = - :t Ai
i=l

j=i+l

Where x, is (nxl) and each of the Ai is an (n x n) matrix of parameters. Equation
(1.12) is derived from the unrestricted VAR model given by equation (1.11). Matrix 7t is
the most important term in this presentation. Rank of 7t is equal to the number of
cointegrating vectors in this model and it identifies the long run relationship of the
variables. It is also equal to the number of characteristic roots in the matrix 7t. For
example, if rank or characteristic roots of matrix 7t is equal to one, there is only one
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cointegration relationship in the system Null hypothesis in the trace statistic method, is
the number of distinct cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to some specific number,
say r, where r = 0, 1,2 ...etc. Maximum-eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis of r
cointegrating vectors against the alternative of r+ 1. For instance, it tests r =0 against the
alternative of r = 1 etc. According to Chakraborty and Basu (2002), if there is any
divergence of results between these tests, it is recommended that one should rely on the
evidence based on the maximum-eigenvalue test since the results of the latter are more
reliable for small samples. Tables 1.6 through 1.8 give results of the Johansen test for
total FDI, transfer funds, and reinvested funds.
Both the trace statistic and max-eigenvalue statistic clearly shows a single
cointegration relationship in each equation. This suggests the Engle and Granger single
equation method is appropriate for estimating cointegrating relationships. Normalized
cointegrating coefficients for all three types of foreign direct investment are given in the
Table 1.9. These results are qualitatively similar to findings that based on Engle and
Granger cointegration procedure. For example, both tests indicate that in the long run, the
corporate tax rate exerts a significant negative effect on total FDI and transfer funds, but
not on reinvested funds. This justifies the single equation method and also implies that
results are robust. More standard robustness tests will be carried out in the latter part of
this essay. The next section investigates whether the results would change once structural
breaks are allowed to enter the model.
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Table 1.6
A: Johansen Cointegration Test: Total FDI
Trace Statistic
Trace Statistic

5% Critical
Value

1% Critical
Value

135.73

124.24

133.57

At most 1

85.03

94.15

103.18

At most 2

49.75

68.52

76.07

Number of cointegration
equations
••
None

Note: *(**) Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level.
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at both 5% and ·1 % levels.

Table 1.6
Continued
B: Johansen Cointegration Test: Total FDI
Max-Eigenvalue Statistic
Number of cointegration
equations

Max-Eigen

5% Critical
Value

1% Critical
Value

50.69

45.28

51.57

At most 1

35.28

39.37

45.10

At most 2

22.47

33.46

38.77

None

**

Statistic

Note: *(**) Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level. Max
eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at both 5% and 1%
levels.
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Table 1.7
A: Johansen Cointegration Test: Transfer Funds
Trace Statistic
Trace Statistic

5% Critical
Value

1% Critical
Value

140.68

124.24

133.57

At most 1

91.10

94.15

103.18

At most 2

52.65

68.52

76.07

Number of cointegration
equations
••
None

Note: *(**) Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level.
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at both 5% and 1% levels.

Table 1.7
Continued
B: Johansen Cointegration Test: Transfer Funds
Max-Eigenvalue Statistic
5% Critical
Value

1% Critical
Value

49.58

45.28

51.57

At most 1

38.45

39.37

45.10

At most 2

24.26

33.46

38.77

Number of cointegration
equations
••
None

Max-Eigen
Statistic

Note: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1 ro) level. Max
eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at both 5% and 1%
levels.
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Table 1.8
A: Johansen Co integration Test: Reinvested Funds
Trace Statistic
Trace
Statistic

5% Critical
Value

1% Critical
Value

143.62

124.24

133.57

At most 1

92.06

94.15

103.18

At most 2

51.85

68.52

76.07

Number of cointegration
equations
••
None

Note: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level Trace test
indicates 1 co integrating equation at both 5% and 1% levels.

Table 1.8
Continued
B: Johansen Cointegration Test: Reinvested Funds
Max-Eigenvalue Statistic
Statistic

5% Critical
Value

1% Critical
Value

51.55

45.28

51.57

At most 1

39.37

40.21

45.10

At most 2

24.31

33.46

38.77

Number of cointegration
equations
None

•

Max-Eigen

Note: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level. Maxeigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at 5% level.
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Table 1.9
Johansen Cointegration Results
Variable
CITR
GDP

IMPORTS
MWR
INT

EEXR

Total FDI

Transfer
Funds

Reinvested Funds

16.434

13.930a

-22.213

(2.726)

(3.727)

(3.850)

10.818a

9.371a

-11.770

(2.628)

(3.195)

-4.167a

-3.761a

(3.027)
1.571

(0.732)

(0.923)

(0.729)

-3.130b

-1.874

3.101

(0.646)

(l.542)

(1.331)

1.124b

1.636

2.235

(0.570)

(0.750)
a

(0.622)

-14.107

-12.156

8.328

(0.771)

(3.175)

(2.026)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. aSignificant at the 1%level.
b
Significant at the 5% level. cSignificant at the 10% level. Lag corporate
tax rate is not included in the VAR specification.Variables are in natural
logs.
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Cointegration Relationships with Structural Break

This study uses data that spans five decades. For a longer data set, it is customary
to check for the potential structural break of the model. The Chow test (1960) is used for
this purpose. The Chow structural break point test separates the sample into sub samples
and examines whether there are significant differ�nces in each estimated equation.
Existence of a difference indicates a structural break in the relationship. This can be
tested using either F-statistic or log likelihood ratio statistic. This study uses log
likelihood ratio statistic. It compares the restricted and unrestricted maximum value of
the log likelihood function. The test statistic has a x,2 distribution with (n-1 )lk degrees of
freedom under the null of no structural change in the relationships.
Researchers, including Hartman (1984) point out that it is 1981 tax reforms that
spurred the interest of foreign companies of investing in the United States. Careful
observation of the data set also confirms this notion. Accordingly, we use 1981 as the
structural break point in the Chow test and the results are reported in the Table 1. 10.
Results do not provide any evidence of structural break for the total FDI and transfer
funds. However, test results regarding reinvested funds decisively reject the null
hypothesis of no structural break. This further confirms the complex nature of reinvested
funds components. Cointegration results for the reinvested funds in the presence of
structural break are presented in the Table 1.11.
Overall explanatory power of the regression has improved considerably once this
break is included in the estimation. To illustrate, the cointegration equation now explains
97 percent of the variation of reinvested funds for the period 1957-1980 and 73 percent
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Table 1.10
Chow Breakpoint Test
Equation

Log Likelihood Ratio

Probability

Total FDI

17.035

0.107

Transfer Funds

32.097

0.073

Reinvested Funds

34.372

0.000
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Table 1.11
Engle and Granger Cointegration Results with Break
Variable
C

Reinvested Funds

Reinvested Funds

1957-1980

1981-1999

a

9.615

41.019

(1.162)

(80.627)

0.008

-4.760
(4.383)

CITR1-1

(0.113)
-0.211

GDP

(0.136)
0.215b

(6.464)
-25.736

(0.092)

(16.673)

-0.114b

24.750

(0.049)

(14.932)

0.074

-4.342

(0.055)

(6.149)

a

0.072

-5.245

(0.023)

(4.214)

0.063

2.656

(0.089)

(3.349)

0.970

0.730

CITR

IMPORTS
MWR
INT
EEXR
R-Squared

-0.797

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. aSignificant at the 1%level.
Significant at the 5% level. cSignificant at the 10% level. Variables are
in natural logs.

b
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for the period 1981-1999. These new R2 values are considerably higher compared to the
one obtained without imposing any break. However, as far as corporate tax effects are
concerned, results are not much different after the break. Both current and lag tax rates
are small and insignificant.
Although overall explanatory power has improved as a result of the break, its
usefulness is questionable because none of the coefficients are statistically different from
zero for the period 1981-1999. Signs of some of the parameters also seem economically
implausible. Hence, the model we are using seems well suited to explain total FDI and
transfer funds, but it may not be appropriate to analyze reinvested funds. However, that
should not be a factor to overlook the importance of findings of this essay because
reinvested funds currently only comprises approximately 6 percent of total inbound FDI
in the United States.
Short Run Dynamics

Long run relationship does not provide any information regarding the short run
behavior and the adjustment process of the variables. Once existence of a long run model
is established, it is easy to estimate the short run model applying the Engle and Granger
(1987) Error Correction Model (ECM). According to the Granger representation theorem,
cointegration relationship guarantees an ECM, because for any set of I(1) variables, error
correction and cointegration are equivalent representations. If y1 and Zt are cointegrated
(1,1), then the variables have ECM in the form given in given (1.13).
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(1 .13 )

All of the regressors except the error correction term are expressed in first
differences. This makes all of the terms in equation ( 1.13) are stationary or integrated of
order zero.
This procedure involves two important steps. The first step is to estimate the
cointegration equation and capture the residuals. The second step estimates the error
correction model as in equation ( 1.13). Equations ( 1.14) through ( 1.16) show the specific
form of the error correction term (e,_ 1) this study has followed.
ECTfdi

= FDI,_1

7

-

(/30 + /31 CITR,_1 + L/3;X,_1 + E,_1)

ECT,raifer = TFDJ,_1
ECTreinven

-

= RFDJ,_1

(1.14)

7

.

(/30 + /31 CJTR,_1 + L/3;X,_1 + E_11)

-

(/30 + /31 CJTR,_1 +

L /3;X,_ + E_
7

i•2

1

11)

(1.15)
(1.16)

The ECM is practically important for many reasons. First and foremost, it
provides an alternative test for any possible cointegration relationship between the
variables. Statistical significance of the error correction term suggests such a meaningful
relationship. Second, the magnitude of the coefficient of the error correction term
contains important information regarding the dynamics of the system This coefficient is
also known as the adjustment_ parameter. In order to analyze short run dynamics of three
components of FDI, three error correction equations are estimated. Results are reported in
Table 1.12.
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Table 1.12
Short Run Results
Variable

Total FDI

Transfer
Funds

Reinvested Funds

Constant

-0.342b

0.003

-0.329

�CITR

(0.129)
-1.852

(0.089)
-3.764b

(0.301)
2.229b

(l.241)

(1.557)

1.225

1.795

(0.977)
1.130

(0.867)

(0.999)

(1.078)

5.418b

-0.015

9.652

(2.131)

(l.903)

(7.104)

8

8

�CITR1-1
�GDP
�IMPORTS
�WR

�INT
�EEXR

Adjustment Parameter
Adjusted R2

c

1.779

1.080

0.527

(0.529)

(0376)

(0.409)

-0.664

- l.153c

-1.364

(0.739)

(0.610)

(l.749)

0.469

0.530c

0.121

(0.291)

(0.267)

(0.352)

-0.439

0.089

1.074

(0.918)

(1.018)

(0.998)

'

.,I

-1.00

a

-1.00

a

-0.938

(0.178)

(0.219)

(0.219)

0.64

0.50

0.53

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 8Significant at the 1% level.
b
Significant at the 5% level. cSignificant at the 10% level. Variables are in
natural logs.
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As expected, the cof]X)rate tax rate exerts a significant negative effect on transfer funds in
the short run. A one percent decrease in the U.S. tax rate would increase the level of
transfer funds in the U.S. by 3.7 percent. We find significantly positive short run
coefficients for imports and interest rate, while minimum wage rate display a significant
negative relationship. We find a significant positive short run relationship between the
tax rate and reinvested funds. This finding counters our expectations although Slemrod
(1990) and other studies have reported positive long run relationships between tax rates
and FDI. 6 Scholes and Wolfson (1990) attribute this finding to tax policies in the capital
exporting country.
For example, if investors are from a country that adopts tax credit system it may
not be surprising to find a positive association between host country cof]X)rate tax rate
and inbound FDI. Tax credit countries tax worldwide income and give credit for foreign
taxes paid. Suppose J apailese investors face a 35 percent cof]X)rate income tax rate in the
U.S. and a 40 percent tax rate at home. A small increase in the U.S. tax rate, with an
unchanged Japanese tax rate, will favor Japanese firms who still pay 40 percent at home
while domestic U.S. investors pay a higher rate. lb.is might be one of the reasons for this
positive relationship between reinvested funds and U.S. tax rate.
A significantly negative coefficient on the adjustment parameter in all three sets
of results reported in Table 1.12 confirms our findings of the cointegration relationship.
This is required to assure a meaningful relationship between variables. Testing the
significance of the speed of adjustment coefficient is another way to show that the model
6

For example, Swenson's (1994) panel data study found a median tax rate elasticity of 2.7.
54

converges to steady state solution. 7 Adjustment to the long equilibrium completes within
one-year period except for reinvested funds, in which only 93 percent of the
disequilibrium is corrected during one-year period.
Robustness Check

Several diagnostic tests are used t? detennine whether results are robust. This
includes autocorrelation tests, and regression specification tests. Satisfactory performance
against these tests undoubtedly raises the level of reliability of the findings. Cointegration
and error correction estimation results are valid only if the residuals of the equations are
white noise. Serially correlated residuals have been identified as a frequent reason for
encountering non-white noise error problem
This study uses the Breusch-Godfrey LaGrange Multiplier (LM) test to check for
serial correlation. It is more suitable because unlike the Durbin-Watson statistic, the LM
test can be used to test for higher order serial correlation problem which is common in
time series studies. This test captures residuals from each of cointegration equation and
then estimates the error equation using the general form given in equation ( 1.17).
Residuals are regressed on original explanatory variables and residuals up to a certain
number of lags. The product of the number of observations and R2 is called Breusch
Godfrey LM statistic. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation against the alternative
is tested using this statistic.
e, =

7

x,r + cf
a,et -k) + m,
k=l

(1.17)

See Harris and Sollis (2003).
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Results are shown in Table 1.13. Results do not indicate a serious serial
correlation problem for the total FDI and transfer funds at the 5 percent level. However,
residuals for the reinvested funds are serially correlated. This further strengthens the
previous findings of this essay that reinvested funds are rather difficult to analyze using
simple time series techniques.
A Regression Specification Test (RESET) suggested by Ramsey (1969) is used to
detennine whether the specification of the model is correct. RESET is widely used to
check for an incorrect functional form, omission of relevant explanatory variables, and
simultaneity problems. Specification errors can lead to a non-zero mean for the
disturbance term that will result in biased estimates. RESET estimates the original
cointegration equations including powers of the predicted values of the dependent
Variable. If the original specification is correct, then these new terms should not add
significant explanatory power to the new model. The null hypothesis of no specification
error is tested using log likelihood ratio.
As reported in Table 1.14, RESET suggests the specification is correct for the
transfer funds and total FDI regressions. However, it rejects the null of no specification
error in the case of reinvested funds. This may clarify why some studies find reinvested
funds are not responsive to tax rates. Incorrect specification may contribute to the poor
performance of the reinvested funds equation. More research is required to detennine the
correct specification for reinvested funds. This finding does not obscure the importance
of the FDI tax rate relationship because reinvested funds are only a small part of total FDI
in the United States.
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Table 1.13
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test Results
Equation

Obs*R2

P-Value

Total FDI

5.525

0.063

Transfer Funds

0.797

0.671

Reinvested Funds

6.356

0.041

'

Table 1.14
RESET Test Results
Equation

Log Likelihood Ratio

P-Value

Total FDI

2.411

0.120

Transfer Funds

0.944

0.331

Reinvested Funds

34.352

0.000
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Conclusions
This essay investigates long run and short run relationships between corporate
income tax rates and FDI in the United States. The corporate income tax rate is found to
exert a significant negative effect on total FDI inflows in the long run. Th.is long run
relationship is confirmed by the Engle and Granger (1987) single equation procedure as
well as the VAR approach adopted by Johansen ( 1991) cointegration test. Results suggest
that a one percent decrease in the tax rate would increase total FDI in the U.S. by 2.4
percent. This finding is similar to results reported in earlier studies that use different tax
rates and FDI measures. We did not confinn a significant short run relationship between
tax rates and total FDI flows. However, it is important to note that a cointegration
relationship is not confirmed once non-tax variables are excluded from the model. So, it
is the combination of tax and other non-tax variables that make this relationship.
Tax rates exert significant negative effects on transfer funds in both the long run
and short run. Tax rate elasticities are quite large, ranging in absolute value from 3.7 in
the short run to 4.2 in the long run. In the long run, investors have more time and
infonnation to respond to tax rate changes. Currently, transfer funds account for more
than 90 percent of total FDI in the United States. Therefore, these findings are
particularly important for policy analysis.
We did not find a significant long run relationship between tax rates and
reinvested funds. An incorrect specification and a structural break contribute to this
finding. A significant positive short run relationship is established between the tax rate
and reinvested funds. Earlier studies that report similar positive relationships between tax
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rates and FDI attribute their findings to the combined effects of foreign country and U.S.
tax policies.
Collectively, results suggest that foreign investors are highly responsive to
corporate income tax rates used by the United States. This suggests the U.S. has
considerable scope to use tax policies to attract FDI from abroad.
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Essay Two
An Empirical Assessment of the Impa·cts of Host Country and Home
Country Corporate Tax Rates on FDI in the United States
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Introduction
This essay investigates the effects of host country and home country tax policies
on the amount of FDI flows into the United States. Studies on the detenninants of FDI
have largely ignored home country tax rates. However, this issue is becoming more and
more relevant due to the so-called race to the bottom tax competition among
industrialized countries. The tax-cutting trend is continuing throughout the world and
particularly in industrialized countries. Not a single OECD member country raised its
corporate income tax rates in the year 2001. Instead, twelve members cut their rates
(KPMG, 2002). The gap between tax rates is shrinking and quickly converging to a
harmonized rate. For instance, between 1988 and 1997, the OECD average statutory
corporate tax rate declined from 44 percent to 36 percent (Gropp and Kostial, 2001),
which is just one percent higher than current U.S. corporate income tax rate.. One of the
}

most probable reasons for this tax-cutting trend is to attract mobile capital such as foreign
direct investment from other locations and to keep domestic investors from moving out of
the country. However, if a country introduces tax policies to attract foreign capital
without paying due attention to this interrelationship, it may find that it is hard to realize
its expectations for achieving the targeted amount of foreign mobile capital.
In addition to examining home country tax rates, this study also examines the
impacts of different taxation systems on the amount of FOi inflows to the United States.
It is known that foreign investors are subject to corporate income tax in the host country
and then upon repatriation, the profits can also be taxed in the home country. In order to
alleviate this double taxation, countries use two types of relief methods. One is called a
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territorial taxation system in which investors are completely exempted from home
country taxation. The other method is called a worldwide taxation system in which
capital-exporting countries provide a tax credit for the taxes paid in the host country.
Following literature,we refer those countries that use territorial system as exemption
countries and those that use worldwide system as credit countries. So, it is expected that
investors from tax exemption countries be more sensitive to tax rate changes in the U.S.,
while investors from tax credit countries be more responsive to tax rate changes in their
home country given home country tax rates are higher than host country tax rates.
This study uses a panel of nine investing countries: Canada,France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Australia, Belgium,Italy,Japan,,and the United Kingdom over the
period 1982-2000. The first five countries in the list adopt the tax exemption system
while the rest follow tax credit system These nine countries altogether contribute more
than 85 percent of total US FDI inflows during the sample period.
This study attempts to address two timely questions regarding corporate taxation
and foreign direct investment in the United States. First,it investigates whether the
corporate income tax rate is an important determinant of FDI in the United States.
Compared to essay one, which is a time series analysis,we expect a better estimate for
the tax rate elasticity because a ·panel allows for the inclusion of both host and home
country tax rates. Second, we ask if investors from tax credit countries significantly
differ in their tax response relative to those from tax exemption countries.
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Literature Review
As pointed out in essay one, earlier time series studies have not incorporated
home country tax rates into their analysis. Slemrod (1990) is the first time series study
that controls for the tax system of the home country. Using FDI data for 3 credit
countries and 4 exemption countries, Slemrod estimates tax rate elasticity to see if
investors from tax exemption countries respond differently than those from tax credit
countries. He tests the hypotheses that FDI from exemption countries should be at least as
sensitive to U.S. tax rates as FDI from tax credit countries, and FDI from exemption
countries should be positively related to the rate of home country taxation. However, he
does not find convincing results to accept or reject these two hypotheses. Limitations of
the econometric procedure that he uses may be one of the explanations for his
inconclusive results. It would have been better if he used panel estimation techniques
rather than estimating separate time series equations for each country. However, many
still consider this as a pioneering work because it is the first study that emphasizes the
importance of incorporating home country tax rates into the FDI and taxation literature.
Cassou (1997) makes an effort to extend Slemrod's work by using a panel data
empirical approach. Using a panel of six investing countries (France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), he investigates the impact of tax policy on
foreign direct investment flows between the U.S. and other countries. The use of a panel
approach enables him to include more non-tax variables such as the unemployment rate
and interest rate into the analysis. With these modifications, he finds strong evidence
regarding a negative relationship between U.S. corporate tax rate FDI inflows. His results
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suggest that home country corporate income tax rate exerts a significant effect on
investment flows. Unlike Slemrod, he finds that some non-tax variables such as the
exchange rate and unemployment rate are significant detenninants of FDI. However, he
does not differentiate between tax credit and tax exemption countries.
Swenson (1994) questions the so-called negative relationship between tax rates
and FDI in the United States. Her doubt is based on the general equilibrium results
derived by Scholes and Wolfson (1990). They point out that in some cases, it is possible
that foreign investors increase their investments in response to higher U.S. corporate
taxes. To empirically test this hypothesis, she uses industry level FDI data from tax credit
and tax exemption countries. Unlike previous studies, she uses the average tax rate
instead of marginal or statutory corporate tax rates. Further, her study controls for one
year lag tax rate and exchange rate variables. Two separate equations are estimated: one
for the tax credit countries and the other for tax exemption countries. As expected, the
study finds positive tax elasticity for the investments from tax credit countries. Moreover,
she concludes that the surge in FDI in the United States in the 1980s was driven by tax
changes rather than changes in macro economic variables. Swenson has another
interesting finding regarding the relationship between tax rates and FDI. They are
positively related when average tax rate is used, but negatively related once the effective
marginal tax rate is used. To explain this anomaly, she separates FDI data into two major
categories; manufacturing industry, and combined industry. This study shows that only
manufacturing industry data retain the positive coefficient under both types of tax rate
data. Swenson also suggests that th� average tax rate is a better indicator than the
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effective marginal tax rate of the tax response to FDI because the latter is extremely
sensitive to macroeconomic variables such as the interest rates and depreciation rates.
Over the years, studies have contributed to the literature by extending the analysis
of taxation and FDI in various ways. To illustrate, some studies investigate the impact of
state corporate income tax rates on the allocation of FDI in the United States. Hines
(1996), uses the data from seven investing countries into 50 U.S. states to examine the
effect of sub national taxes on investment location decisions. He uses real investment
data rather than financial flows to study this issue and also controls for the different tax
systems of investing countries. Hines's study finds that foreign investors from tax
exemption countries are considerably more responsive to state taxes than are investors
from tax credit countries. The study finds that investors from tax exemption countries
reduce their investment shares by approximately 10 percent for every one- percent
change in state corporate tax rate. Although an elasticity of that magnitude is
questionable, his results support findings of previous important studies, which suggest
that state taxes have significant effect on business locations within the United States
(Papke, 1991). Since Hines is using single year data, it is possible that results are due to
time specific features rather than to general outcomes. Agostini and Tulayasathien (2003)
examine the effects of state corporate income taxes on the location of foreign direct
investment using PPE data for five years. Following Hines, they also use top marginal
statutory corporate tax rates to measure state tax impacts and include FDI data from tax
credit countries as well as tax-exempt countries to control for the foreign tax system
However, they use a discrete choice model to estimate FDI equations. They find that FDI
is sensitive to state corporate income tax rates. However, they find that the tax rate
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elasticity for credit countries is not statistically different from the one for exemption
countries. Another investigation of state tax effects is presented in Swenson (2001). She
separates FDI into six different components: Establishment of new plants, plant
expansions, mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, equity increases, and other FDI.
Then she estimates separate equations for each components. The study uses data from 46
countries into 50 U.S. States. One significant feature of the study is the use of number of
investment projects instead of the value of investment flows. Swenson finds a significant
negative relationship between the state corporate income tax rate and FDI in each
equation. Results for some of the other variables differ across equations.
Recently, some studies have found a different approach to measure the effects of,
taxation of foreign direct investments. Instead of using inbound FDI data, they use
outbound FDI data to evaluate tax impacts of tax rate changes on FDI flows. For
instance, Cummings and Hubbard ( 1994) examine tax sensitivity of a panel on American
companies abroad for the period of 1980-1991. lbis is the first known study that has used
micro level firm data instead of aggregate data for the empirical part. They estimate two
equations. Equation one is estimated including corporate tax rates as an explanatory
variable and equation two is estimated excluding tax rate. They expect to see implausible
parameters in equation two if tax rate is an important determinant in investment decision.
The study finds that American investors are less sensitive to host country tax rates
because of the tax credit system used by the United States.
Desai, Foley and Hines (2002) also use FDI data of American multinational firms
to investigate the impacts of taxation on the location of foreign investments. Particular
attention is given to tax competition and the role of chains of ownership. Under the
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chains of ownership, affiliates are owned indirectly through other affiliates rather than
owned directly by a parent. As discussed before, the United States follows a tax credit
system of taxing its own citizens who conduct business overseas. Therefore, American
companies are sensitive to both host country as well as U.S. corporate tax rates.
However, chains of ownership can be used to reduce the tax burden of home country
taxes. In this case, they hypothesize that investors from tax credit countries are more
sensitive to foreign tax rate differences.
Based on data of American companies between 1982-1997, Desai, Foley and
Hines show that investment patterns of indirectly owned affiliates are considerably more
sensitive to local tax rates than that of directly owned foreign affiliates. Results also
indicate a different level of tax sensitivity between American and non- American firms.
The difference is due to different methods of tax systems used by the countries. Though
the U.S. adopts a tax credit system, many other countries use the tax exemption method.
Most of the studies have used U.S. data to investigate the relationship between
corporate tax rates and FDI. However, there are some studies that use FDI data of other
countries to understand the issue. For instance, Billington (1999) uses the statutory
corporate income tax rates to estimate the tax rate elasticity. He uses direct investment
data from seven investing countries into the United Kingdom Unlike the studies that
based on the U.S. data, Billington uses a number of variables to control for the non-tax
determinants. He includes gross domestic product, imports, and expenditure on
transportation, interest rate, and unemployment rate as explanatory variables. This study
uses similar steps that have adopted by the studies that use U.S. data. As explained
before, Hines (1996) investigates the impact of state tax changes on FDI behavior.
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Similarly, Billington estimates a multi-region model to investigate whether local
determinants are any different from country level determinants. Regional dummies were
also included. Since FDI data are not available at regional levels, Billington uses the
annual number of foreign investment projects that were started in each of regions as a
proxy variable. Further, his study does not use any regional tax rat�s because they are
determined at the national level rather than at the local level. At the regional level, some
non-tax variables, such as unit labor costs and unemployment are the most significant
factors.
The majority of the existing studies on taxation and foreign direct investment are
focused on FDI inflows in a single country. Quere, Fontagne, and Revil (2001) address
this gap in the literature by undertaking a multi-country analysis. Findings based on the
information of a single host country are harder to generalize because they may. have taken
place due to some host specific effects. Using a panel of bilateral FDI flows across 11
OECD countries over the 1984-1996 period, they investigate the role of tax differential
between countries on foreign investments.
This paper provides a nice empirical analysis of the impact of tax rate differentials
on FDI inflows. It uses both statutory and effective marginal corporate income tax rates
for the estimation. Tax differentials are measured as the tax difference between two
countries. Tiris study also controls for different taxation schemes such as credit and
exemption methods. They use a better way to handle tax credit and tax exemption issue in
their analysis. To illustrate they set the tax differential to zero when the investor comes
from a credit scheme country as long as host country tax rate is lower than that of the
source country. As in Young (1988), this study also includes a lagged dependent variable
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because they suspect that the whole history of taxation, and not just current taxation,
matter for foreign investors' decision to relocate their capital. They report a significantly
negative tax rate elasticity. As far as different tax systems are concerned, they find that a
credit system would reduce fiscal incentives to relocate. Further, the study implies that
tax harmonization is not the solution for the harmful tax competition among countries.
Results also refute the popular notion that smaller countries are in a better
position when it comes to the tax competition. Citing agglomeration-related factors, they
point out that a small peripheral country should. display substant.ially lower tax rates in
order to compensate for distance to investors and low market potential. Even after
controlling for the agglomeration factors, this study finds that tax rates play a significant
role determining location of foreign direct investments. According to them, this is true as
long as different tax schemes such as credit and exemption systems are controlled for.
Gropp and Kostial (2001) study the link between FDI and corporate tax revenues
in addition to corporate tax rates. This is the first known study that estimates the
relationship between tax revenue and FDI in a host country. Previous studies have mainly
focused on some form of corporate income tax rates rather than revenues. Their study
finds a strong relationship between the two variables. Their sample covers 13 countries
for the period 1988-1997. Another interesting feature of this study is to estimate the
effects of home country tax rates on FDI outflows. They·observe that tax exemption
countries experience larger outflows than credit countries.
Wei (2000) contributes to the literature by using FDI .stocks rather than flows. He
uses FDI stock data from 12 source countries to 45 host countries. Another improvement
of the study is to control for the corruption level in the host country. He finds that one75

percent increase in the top statutory marginal corporate income tax rate reduces inward
FDI by 4.8 percent. In order to control for the different tax systems of the countries he
includes an interaction of the tax rate and a dummy. The dummy takes on the value of 1
if the source country adopts tax credit system Results yield no significant difference in
tax responses to different taxation schemes of home countries.
Mooij and Ederveen (2001) point out that comparison among the above studies is
difficult because specifications and data sets are different. In order to alleviate these
difficulties, they conduct so-called meta analysis for some well-known studies. This
investigation support of the view that investors from tax exemption countries are more
likely to respond to changes in host country taxes than do investors from tax credit
countries. Specifically they find semi-elasticities that pertain to the former group are 2.16
times larger compare to the studies that �o not specify the home country of the investor.
However, they also find inconsistent results regarding the effects of different taxation
systems of home countries. To illustrate, the semi-elasticity for investors from tax credit
countries is 0.56 larger compared to the studies that do not specify the home country of
the investor. This finding is inconsistent with the theory.
Theoretical Background

Neoclassical trade theories such as the Hecksher-Ohlin theory explicitly assume
factors of production are immobile. These theories focused on trade in goods and not
trade in factors. Over time, more attention has been devoted to international factor
mobility. Mundell (1957) incorporates trade in factors into the model and shows that
trade in goods and, factor inputs can work as substitutes for each other. These
developments in international trade theories had a little influence on public finance
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policies8• As Gordon and Hines (2002) point out, the assumption of a closed economy
was widely thought to have been an adequate approximation of the US economy over
much of the postwar period. How_ever, tax policies based on closed economy assumption
are no longer considered appropriate.
This essay investigates how foreign investors take tax policies of both countries
into consideration in deciding where to locate their mo bile capital. This is a particularly
interesting issue for foreign direct investors because they are required to pay corporate
taxes in the host country and then in the home country upon repatriation of profits to the
parent company. However, not all the countries adopt the same policy of taxing their
residents' foreign source income. Currently countries follow two distinct approaches of
taxing foreign source income. Countries such as Canada, Germany, and Netherlands
follow an exemption system, while the U.S., Japan, and the United Kingdom follow a tax
credit system
If home country adopts an exemption system, its investors have to pay only host
country taxes. Therefore, they should be more concerned about changes in host country
corporate tax rates and less sensitive to tax rate changes in the home country. With the
perfect capital mobility assumption, investors from tax exemption countries should
achieve equal after tax rate of return in the equilibrium (Swenson, 1994).
Tax credit countries follow a worldwide system of taxing foreign source income.
Sometimes, this method is also called a residence-based taxation system This system
allows investors to claim credit for the corporate taxes they paid in the host country. In

8

However. Diamond and Mirrlees ( 1971) discusses about the difficulties that arise when taxing returns to capital
investment in open economies.
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other words, they have to pay the difference between the host tax rate and the home
country rate. For example, the top corporate income t� rate in Japan is 42 percent while
the U.S. adopts a 35 percent rate. As both countries adopt credit system, a Japanese firm
that earns 1,000 dollars in the U.S. pays 350 dollars corporate income tax in the U.S. and
an additional 70-dollar yen equivalent Japan.
If the host country tax rate exceeds the home country rate, then that country
should be considered an exemption country. For example, in Ireland, the current top
corporate tax rate is 16 percent. Therefore, an Irish firm that operates in the U.S. has to
pay only U.S. corporate taxes. This situation is called excess foreign tax credit. Our
sample mainly consists of tax credit countries that face a deficit foreign tax credit rather
than an excess foreign tax credit. In other words, tax liability in the host country is
smaller than that of home country. Under this situation, an increase in the host country
.I

corporate tax rate can have a subtle effect on FDI inflows. Consider our earlier example·
on this page and, suppose that the U.S. raises its top corporate income tax rate to 36
percent. Then the Japanese firm now pays 360 dollars in the U.S. and 60 dollars in
Japan. Its total tax liability remains the same. The Japanese firm may even be in a
favorable position compared to domestic investors as well as to investors from tax
exemption countries. This research investigates whether we have sufficient empirical
evidence to suggest that home country tax system is a critical factor for investment
decisions.
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Contribution
This essay addresses two major issues in the taxation and FDI literature. First, it
investigates whether corporate tax rate changes can affect the amount of FDI in the
United States. Both host and home country tax rates are included. This is important
because it has been shown that tax systems in capital exporting countries substantially
affect investors' decision of where to locate their investments. A fixed effects model is
used to estimate the panel that consists of nine countries and 19 years of data. In addition,
random effects and constant coefficient techniques are also used as a means of checking
the accuracy of our findings.
Second, this essay investigates whether investors' decisions are affected by the
various taxation systems used in their own countries. As explained before, we control fo·r
the different tax systems by including countries that adopt tax credit
system and countries
.
.•
that adopt tax exemption system Our sample consists of 4 tax credit and 5 tax exemption
countries. The original sample is separated into these two groups and then estimated to
determine whether results are significantly different from each other.
Investors from tax exemption countries should have a stronger negative response
to changes in U.S. corporate tax rates compared to those who come from tax credit
countries. On the other hand, a stronger negative response is expected for the changes in
home country taxes from investors that come from tax credit countries. The above
mentioned panel estimation techniques are used to analyze these two hypotheses.
Tiris study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this is the first study
that uses panel estimation techniques to analyze impacts of home country tax systems on
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financial flows ofFDI into the United States9 • Cassou (1997) is the only study that talces
both home and host country tax rates into account, but he does not control for the
different tax systems of home countries.
The second improvement is our use of a more comprehensive data set. The most
recent study, covers FDI and tax data only thorough 1970-1989 (Cassou 1997). This
limitation is critical because we have witnessed a considerable change in tax rate changes
by major investing countries as well as a remarkable increase in FDI inflows in 1990s.
This essay consists of data for nine countries over the period 1982-2000, enabling us to
capture all significant changes in tax policies during the last two decades.
A third improvement pertains to the type of corporate rate used to estimate the tax
rate elasticity. Previous studies have generally use only one form of the corporate tax
rate. There are three popular corporate income tax rates in the literature, namely, top
statutory marginal rate (SCTR), effective marginal rate (EMCTR), and effective average
tax rate (EACTR). Both EMCTR and EACTR are based on tax codes and other variables
such as interest rate and depreciation rate. Researchers are not in agreement regarding
which taxes should be used for estimating the tax rate elasticity. This study uses all three
forms of tax rates and compares findings.
Finally, this essay controls for other important determinants ofFDI. Compared to
time series studies that are confined to a small data set, a panel study has the advantage of
including more relevant variables. Previous studies have not made use of this feature and
are almost always limited to a very few explanatory variables such as gross domestic
product, exchange rate and unemployment rate. Even studies that controlled for the non9

Slemrod ( 1990) uses time series techniques to analyze this issue.
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tax detenninants have been unable to include them together in a single study. This essay
controls for all the explanatory variables that have shown to be significant in separate
studies. In addition to the above variables, I include bilateral trade, unit labor cost,
interest rate, and a proxy for the infrastructure, and relative gross domestic product to
control for non-tax detemrinants.
Empirical Strategy

This study use panel estimation techniques to estimate the model. A panel
approach has a number of advantages over single time series or a cross section method of
estimation. It allows researcher to use more observations and have a larger numbers of
degrees of freedom This allows the inclusion of more explanatory variables, which may
lessen the omitted variable bias. It also lets the researcher investigate new issues that are
impossible under pure cross sectional or time series studies. Another advantage of using
panel estimation is related to distribution properties of test statistics. To illustrate,
Dickey and Fuller ( 19 81) points out that if time series are nonstationary, then even if the
sample size reaches infinity, distributions of OLS parameters are no longer normally
distributed. However, a panel, which comprises independent cross sectional units, may
produce asymptotically normal distributions. In addition to these benefits, a panel
approach is especially important for this study because it has been shown that pure time
series studies have produced weaker results compared to panel studies (Ederveen and
Mooij, 2001).
There are three main methods that one can use to estimate a panel. The easiest
among them is the so-called constant coefficient method. In this method all time series
and cross section observations are combined and then ordinary least squares is applied to
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the entire data set assuming both regressions slope coefficients and intercepts are
identical across countries and over time. This study uses data from 9 countries over 19year period. The general form of the linear model is given in the equation (2.1 ).
FDI;, =a;,+ 13;,x;, + c;
where, i = 1,2,3 ..........9

(2.1)

1

t = 1,2,3, .........19

a. and Wit are 1 x 1 and 1 x k vectors of constants that vary across time and
countries. Xi, is a lx k vector of explanatory variables and ei, is the error term10•
Throughout this analysis, we assume that parameters are constant over time. This is a safe
assumption because our sample uses data that spans no more than.two decades. With this
assumption, the general equation can be written as in the equation (2.2).
FDI;, =a; +f3;x i, +c;,
where, i = 1,2,3 ..........9

(2.2)
t = 1,2,3, .........19

This general form varies according to the specific model used to estimate the
panel. Equation (2.3) displays the constant coefficient model that ignores any country
related differences.
FDI;, = a + /3'X;,+cu

where,

i = 1,2,3 ..........9

(2.3)
t = 1,2,3, ........ .19

However, if the observations are not independent and differences exist between
cross sectional or time series observations, this method may lead to false inferences. This
single OLS regression generally produces biased estimators. Hence, an analysis of
covariance test is conducted to detennine the homogeneity of regression coefficient. If

10

See Hsiao (2003) for detailed information about panel estimation techniques.
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the test rejects overall homogeneity we have to account for that because heterogeneity
bias may lead to meaningless results. Inconsistent and economically meaningless results
arise due to the omitted variables that could explain heterogeneity in the model. Fixed
effects and random effects models make necessary changes to the intercept term to
account for this heterogeneity.
In a fixed effects model, heterogeneity is taken care of by including dummies to
capture cross sectional specific effects or time specific effects. This method captures
systematic differences by raising or lowering the intercept term by a fixed amount for
each cross sectional units. Therefore, the fixed effects estimator allows the intercept to
vary across cross sections, though each country's intercept stays constant over time. In
the literature, this model sometimes called least squares dummy variable model. Equation
(2.4) displays the specific form that we use to estimate fixed effects model.
FDI;, =a;+ p;x;, + £;,
where, i = 1,2,3 ..........9

(2.4)
t = 1,2,3,........ .19

A fixed effects model is easy to estimate and analyze. However, it has some
limitations. The major problem is that it uses a large number of dummy variables that
reduce the degrees of freedom Further, results are not suitable to make out of sample
predictions. These problems can be lessened by using a random effects model.
The random effects model treats omitted individual specific factors as random
variables rather than constant terms. This model implies that unknown country specific
factors are better explained through an error term rather than a constant. Hence, the error
term is comprised of a traditional error term as well as a cross section specific constant
term intercept term of each cross section comprises common constant term as well as a
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cross section specific random variable. Equation (2.5) illustrates random effects model
that we use in this study.
FDI;, = µ + /J�X;, + V;,

where,

i = 1,2,3 ..........9

(2.5)
t = 1,2,3,.........19, and vit =a;+ A,+ e;,

a.,-N(O, o,,_2), A,-N(O, o/) , and E;,-N(O, o/) represent the cross section error
component, the time series error component, and the combined error component,
respectively. The variance ofFDI;, can be expressed as

Otdi

2

= o/ +o;..2 +o/, a sum of

error components. For this reason a random effects model is also called an error
components model (Balestra and Nerlove, 1966). Due to our previous assumption ofno
time specific effects, Oi,.2 becomes zero. We further assume that the individual error
components are uncorrelated with each other and they are not correlated with explanatory
variables.
Both fixed and random effects models allow the intercept term to differ across
cross sectional units. However, the random effects model often assumes that the
distribution ofthe cross sectional specific error term is normal, wbile the fixed effects
model does not impose such restrictions. When the pool contains data for many years,
both models should produce similar results. In the case where the pool is small, random
and fixed specifications can lead to significantly different results. A fixed effects
estimator has an advantage over a random effects estimator because it does not require
assuming effects are independent ofexplanatory variables. If, in fact, covariance of
explanatory variables and cross section specific effects are zero, then the random effects
model produces unbiased, consistent and efficient results. Ifit were not the case, then
random effects estimator generates biased and inconsistent estimates. This probl�m does
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not arise in the fixed effects model. In other words, the fixed effects model always
produces consistent estimates, despite being relatively inefficient if effects are not
constant.
This study utilizes both panel estimation techniques with a particular emphasize
on fixed effects results. This preference is mainly due to a technical problem that arises in
estimating random effects models. In order to estimate a random effects model, it is
required that the number of cross section units be higher than the number of coefficients
in the model. Since we have data for only 9 investing countries, we may not be able to
utilize random effects model unless one variable is dropped from the regression. Our
strategy here is to drop the variable for which the statistical t-value is less than one. If
there is more than one such variable, then the variable with the least t-value will be
dropped from consideration. The fixed effects model does not suffer from this limitation
and allows us to make use of all theoretically relevant variables in the analysis.
We also estimate a GLS version of fixed effects model and constant coefficient
model as a way of correcting for a possible heteroskedasticity problem As explained
above, a fixed effects model is more appropriate for our purpose because it does not
involve such restrictive assumptions as the random effects model. For practical sense, a
random model is more appropriate if the researcher is expecting to make predictions
outside the sample and the sample does not contain all existing cross sectional units. The
data sample covers more than 85 percent of total FDI data into the United States. This
makes it less likely that results will be used to make out of sample predictions. Therefore,
fixed effects model is appropriate for our purpose. Nevertheless, we use results of
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random effects model for comparing and contrasting with results of other alternative
models.
Since this study uses three forms of corporate tax rates (statutory marginal,
effective marginal, effective average), separate equations are estimated for each. This will
enable us to compare the results and determine which tax rate matters most for foreign
investors. Finally, the sample is divided into tax credit and tax exemption groups and
utilizes similar techniques to study impacts of different tax systems on foreign investors'
behavior.
Data Definitions and Sources

Tiris study examines effects of host and home country corporate tax rates on FDI
flows into the United States. A panel of nine countries covering the years 1982-2000 is
used to estimate econometric models. The panel consists of 5 tax exemption countries
and 4 tax credit countries. All the variables are expressed in natural logs11 •
The dependent variable is the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the
U.S. from each investing country. FDI are given in millions of dollars. For this study,
FDI data were obtained from OECD international Direct Investment database. In order to
assess tax responses on FDI inflows, three types of corporate income tax rates are used.
They are: the statutory corporate income tax rate, effective marginal corporate income tax
rate, and effective average corporate income tax rate. All tax data were taken from
International Fiscal Studies (2002) publications. 12

11 A constant is added to the FDI series to make the log transfonnation feasible. This strategy is very common in
the literature (Hartman, 1984, Slemrod 1990, Cassou 1997).
12

IFS has obtained original data from Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm (2002).
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Sum of top federal corporate income tax and average local corporate income tax
rate is defined as the statutory corporate income tax rate. To illustrate, this study adds
extra 4 percent to the U.S. top federal corporate income tax rate to incorporate influence
of state corporate income taxes. Effective marginal and average tax rates have been
calculated under a number of different assumptions. Both rafes assume that FDI is
financed by transfer funds or reinvested earnings. However, there are some rate-specific
assumptions. To illustrate, authors consider real interest rate and depreciation rates as
fixed. However, they use country and time specific rate of inflation in calculating
effective marginal effective corporate income tax rate. They further, assume a fixed 10
percent rate of economic profit for calculating effective average corporate income tax
rate.
Data for other explanatory variables were obtained from various sources. To
illustrate, information on GDP and telephone line per 1000 people was taken from IMF
world economic database. We use OECD database for information on bilateral trade and
unit labor costs data, while data for other control variables were obtained from the
Federal Bank of St. Louis's FRED II database. Below, we briefly describe explanatory
variables and economic reasoning for their inclusion as well as expected signs for tax and
non-tax coefficients.
Three types of host country tax rates along with their home country counterparts
are used in this analysis. As far as whole sample is concerned, we expect FDI to be
negatively correlated with the host country corporate tax rate and positively associated
with the home country tax rate.

87

These results may differ once different tax systems are allowed to enter the
model. For example, we anticipate a less severe negative effect or even a positive impact
from the investors from tax credit countries for a change in the U.S. tax rate. Conversely,
investors from tax exemption countries should respond strongly to tax rate changes in the
U.S. because they pay only U.S. taxes. As far as home country taxes are concerned, we
expect an insensitive response from tax exemption countries and a completely opposite
response from tax credit countries.
Horst's location hypothesis (1972) as well as Dunning's eclectic approach (1981)
suggests that wage rate differences affect location decisions by multinational
corporations. Empirical evidence largely supports this notion (Culem, 1988, Chakraborty
and Basu, 2002). This argument does not take account of labor productivity differences.
For example, industrialized countries boast a relatively more skilled labor force than
other countries. Therefore, high labor costs can be somewhat offset by higher
productivity. Some researchers find no statistically significant evidence to prove that
labor costs is a significant determinant of FDI flows into the U.S. (Wheeler and Mody,
1992). Still, higher labor costs should discourage foreign investors from other
industrialized countries such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and Gennany. So, we expect
a negative relationship between unit labor costs and FDI inflows.
Market size hypothesis suggests that multinational companies always evaluate the
size of the host country market when considering a location. This is particularly true for
the U.S. because it has the largest domestic market of any country. The ratio of host
country GDP to the home country GDP is included in this study to control for the market
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size hypothesis. We expect to see a positive association between relative GDP and FDI
in the United States.
There are two arguments regarding the relationship between trade and FDI. One
group considers trade and FDI as compliments while some take them as substitutes. If
they are compliments, then higher trade between two countries should be associated with
larger FDI inflows to the U.S. and if they are substitutes, higher trade should reduce
inbound FDI. The substitution argument is based on the findings that a multinational will
locate production operations close to its markets and FDI will substitute for trade if trade
costs are not negligible (Quere, Fontagne, and Revil, 2001). However, foreign goods are
important inputs into affiliate manufacturing. Greater sales in foreign markets will require
improved distribution systems, advertising and R&D activities that are facilitated by FDI.
Some studies find evidence for both substitution and complementarity effects (Blonigen
2002). We expect to find a positive correlation between FDI and bilateral trade.
Foreign investors pay particular attention to infrastructure available in a host
country when determining whether a subsidiary should form there. A better infrastructure
should encourage investment; therefore, we should control for this to avoid an omitted
variable problem. A practical problem is to determine what variable should represent
infrastructure in the host country. In general, some form of transportation or
communication variable is used as a proxy to the infrastructure. Some studies use proxies
such as per capita energy consumption, urbanization index, or expenditure on road
transport (Billington, 1999). This paper uses telephone line availability per 1,000
customers as a proxy for the infrastructure. We hypothesize a positive coefficient for this
variable.
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This study includes the bilateral exchange rate as an explanatory variable. It has
been observed that foreign investment rises as dollar depreciates and falls as the dollar
appreciates (Swenson 1994). Empirical evidence generally supports this view. For
example, Froot and Stein (1991) point out that the depreciation of the United States dollar
after 1985 had been the major reason for the unprecedented increase in FDI inflows into
the United States in the late 1980s. Using both FOi inflows and outflows Cushman
(1987) fmds that currency appreciation decreases FDI inflows. Although a large majority
of studies supports this notion, findings are not unanimous (Slemrod, 1990).
Difference in the cost of capital is regarded as a potential determinant of FDI
inflows. We use the U.S. prime interest rate to control for the cost of capital. In addition,
it can be a proxy for the rate of return that investors earn. According to the differential
rate of return hypothesis, international capital flows from one country to another until rate
of return advantages are exhausted. Intuitively, an increase in the cost of capital should
decrease investment in that country. We expect to see a negative relationship between the
interest rate and FOi inflows, though some studies find completely opposite results
(Billington, 1999).
Econometric Results

Table 2.1 presents results from the constant coefficient specification. It ignores
the time and cross sectional dimensions by assuming intercept and slope coefficients are
constant. Any time and cross sectional effects are captured by the error term in the
regression. For the sake of brevity, only heteroskedasticity corrected Generalized Least
Squares (GLS) results are presented here and outputs that are based on Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) are available in the appendix B. Further, results are shown for each of the
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Table 2.1
Constant Coefficient Specification: GLS Results
Variable

Statutory Tax Rate

Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

Effective Average
Tax Rate

Constant

19.814b

16.817b

16.944b

(7.462)
0.531

(7.206)

Host Tax

(8.125)
-l.165b
(0.529)
0.202
(0.254)

(0.856)
0.267
(0.166)

(0.694)
0.075

8

8

Home Tax
ULC
RGDP

(0.218)
-7.4648

-7.629

(1.704)

(l.559)
-0.4708

(1.563)

(0.170)
0.2438

(0.168)
0.2598

(0.039)

(0.048)

-0.435
0.256

8

(0.049)
TPLUS

c

-7.957

(0.171)
BITR

-1.308

3.463

8

4.146

(0.613)

8

-0.4498

3.4988

(0.493)
-0.210

0.057

(0.615)

INT

0.024

(0.255)

(0.247)

EXR

(0.253)
0.027

-0.015

0.023

(0.025)

(0.024)

Adjusted R2

(0.024)
0.931

0.941

0.938

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c, indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
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three types of tax rates: statutory tax rate, effective marginal tax rate, and the effective
average tax rate. We should expect to see a negative coefficient for the host country tax
rate and a positive coefficient for the home country corporate tax rate. Table B 2.1 of the
appendix suggests that tax both types of tax coefficients are generally insignificant. Not
only are tax rate and some of non-tax coefficients insignificant but also they are
inconsistent with the theory.
Compared to the OLS results (see appendix B), GLS method appears to remove
most of these problems in the OLS results. After heteroskedasticity is corrected, we are
able to obtain consistent tax rate coefficients. Overall, results seems much better than
those obtained from OLS method. However, we still have inconsistent outcomes for some
non-tax variables such as relative GDP and exchange rate. We assume no cross sectional
or time specific effects in this model. These are highly restricted assumptions that could
distort the true picture of the relationship between variables.
In order to check whether constant coefficient method is misspecified, an analysis
of covariance test is used. It compares error sums of squares of the constant coefficient
model with other models. We expect error sums of squares to be higher for the constant
coefficient model because it assumes a common intercept for all the countries. We test
the null hypothesis that intercept restrictions are correct. Our results reject the null
indicating that constant coefficient specification is invalid.
We conclude that a specification that allows for heterogeneity across cross section
terms would improve the results. Following this guidance, we estimate a fixed effects
model. This model also can be estimated using either the OLS or GLS method. Leaving
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OLS results for the appendix, we describe the fixed effects GLS model in this section
because it provides results that are more consistent with the theory.
As indicate in the Table 2.2, fixed effects reduces much of the impact of host
country tax rate changes. For example, the host country effective average tax elasticity
falls from-1.308 to-0.912, when fixed effects are allowed to enter the model. This is
also true for the statutory tax rate elasticity, even though the reduction is much smaller.
Results again confirm that foreign investors are responsive to the U.S. corporate income
tax rate. The coefficient of the statutory tax rate is negative and statistically significant at
the 5 percent level. A one percent increase in the statutory top corporate tax rate reduces
FDI inflows by 1.1 percent. The coefficient on the average effective tax rate has the
expected negative sign, but not statistically significant.
As we hypothesized, the home country corporate tax rate seems a significant
determinant of FDI inflows to the United States. Coefficients of both effective marginal
tax rate and effective average tax rate are positive and statistically significant. As far as
statutory tax rate is concerned, it displays the expected positive sign, but statistically
insignificant. Hence, results in general, indicates that whenever home country increases
its corporate tax rate, investors experience a reduction in their existing after tax rate of
return and start dislocating mobile capital from their own country and possibly invest in
the United States in the from of FDI. On average, a 10 percent increase in the home
country effective marginal corporate tax rate would reduce FDI inflows of the United
States by approximately 6 percent. Results also reveal that the response for the home
country tax rate is smaller in magnitude than for the host country tax rate. To illustrate,
average significant tax rate elasticity is -1.1 for the host country tax rate, while it is only
93

Table 2.2
Fixed Effects Specification: GLS Results
Variable
Host Tax
Home Tax
ULC
RGDP

Statutory Tax
Rate

Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

b

-1. lOO

0.724

-0.912

(0.485)

(0.570)

(0.638)

0.069

0.6268

0.512c

(0.293)

(0.102)

(0.289)

-6.1178

-7.0708

-5.8628

(1.206)

(1.263)

(l.197)

5.947

8

8

7.035

(l.575)
BITR
TPLUS
INT
EXR
Adjusted R2

Effective Average
Tax Rate

(1.220)

b

8

4.8918
(1.485)
1.3718

1,313

1.311

(0.509)

(0.425)

(0.510)

1.631

2.570

1.662

(l.524)

(1.328)

(1.504)

-0.07l

-0.281

-0.051

(0.190)

(0.191)

-0.432b

(0.187)
-0.9008

(0.217)

(0.192)

(0.201)

0.958

0.971

0.957

c

-0.401b

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
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0.55 for the home country tax rate. This study supports earlier finding that coefficient of
effective marginal tax rate is generally higher than statutory tax rate based on studies
(Mooij and Ederveen 2001). In this study, home country marginal tax elasticity is
approximately 10 times larger than that of statutory tax elasticity.
Relative GDP also appears to be one of the most important determinants of FDI.
This again proves the generally accepted market size hypothesis regarding the
detenninants of FDI. Ample empirical evidence exists suggesting that market size is a
positive and significant determinant of FDI (Lee and Mansfield, 1996). Our result is also
consistent with time series evidence that is presented in the first essay. Market size is not
only highly significant but also quite large in magnitude. To illustrate, one- percent
increase in relative GDP would increase FDI inflows by approximately 5.5 percents.
Existing empirical evidence generally suggests that trade between host and home
countries tend to be positively associated with the amount of FDI inflows implying that
they are compliments rather than substitutes (Billington, 1999). Results of this essay
strongly support this view. Bilateral trade variable can also be considered as an openness
indicator. Our results imply that openness leads to more FDI flows. It is interesting to
note that the trade variable is significant on all three tax rates and is similar in magnitude
in every cases. Specifically, this study shows that, on average, 10-percent increase in
bilateral trade would increase FDI inflows by 13 percent.
Results reveal that investors are concerned about the infrastructure in the host
country. We find that infrastructure is positively related to FDI inflows. This relationship
is significant only on effective marginal tax rate. As far as magnitude is concerned,
infrastructure is not as strong as other macro variables such as market size and trade. All
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the countries in this sample have the reputation of having a good infrastructure.
Therefore, it is understandable why they do not consider infrastructure as a critical factor
when invest in the United States.
Turning to other non-tax variables, exchange rate exerts a statistically significant
negative effect on the amount of FDI inflows. It means that cheap dollar is an attractive
factor for the foreign investors. Statistically significant relationship holds on all three
types of tax rates. As shown in Table 2.2, our study produces an inelastic coefficient for
the exchange rate regardless of the type of tax rate in the model. Study suggests that
interest rate is not a significant determinant of FDI inflows of the United States.
This study also estimates a random effects model and results are presented in the
appendix. Results of the.random effects model are not substantially different from the
fixed effects specification except some minor changes in non-tax coefficients. One such
difference is that exchange rate becomes insignificant though it keeps the expected sign.
As pointed out before, the random effects model requires that the number of cross
sections be higher than the number of parameters to be estimated. In order to estimate the
model, we omit interest rate variable because it is not statistically significant in the fixed
effects model and its t-value is right around zero. It is interesting to note that coefficients
of both tax and non-tax variables remain almost unchanged in magnitude and
significance. It strongly implies that our results do not suffer from endogeneity bias.
Since this panel covers a large ma jority of U.S. FDI inflows, the fixed effects model is
more appropriate than a random effects model (Hsiao, 2003).
A Hausman (1978) specification test is used to formally test whether fixed effects
and random effects models produce significantly different results. We are unable to reject
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the null hypothesis of fixed effects model and random effects model estimators do not
differ considerably. Under this situation, it is safe to use fixed effects model because if
the individual error component and explanatory variables are correlated, then random
effects estimators are biased, whereas fixed effects estimators are unbiased (Gujarati,
2003).
This essay has raised two questions. The first question was whether host country
and home country taxes matter for foreign investment decisions. Our results suggest that
FDI inflows are negatively correlated with host country tax rate and positively correlated
with home country tax rates. We observe that tax coefficients change slightly with
different tax rates as well as different model specifications. For instance, fixed effects
model produces a positive coefficient on effective marginal tax rate. Although the
coefficient is insignificant, the positive relationship is still counterintuitive. Several
previous studies have encountered a similar problem and they attribute this finding to tax
policies in the capital exporting countries.
As previously stated, a change in the corporate income tax rate could generate
varying impacts on foreign investments depending on whether investors are from a tax
credit or tax exemption country. Since capital exporting countries differ in their treatment
of foreign source income, investors from those countries may also differ in their response
to the U.S. corporate tax rate changes. In the next section we incorporate this important
issue into the analysis.
In order to analyze this question, we split the sample into tax credit and tax
exemption groups. Then we estimate each pool using constant coefficient and fixed
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effects models. It is not possible to estimate the random effects model because it requires
the number of cross section units to be higher than the number of coefficients to be
estimated. Unlike in the previous section, we do not focus on generalized least squares
results. Since we split the sample into two relatively homogeneous groups, this procedure
should alleviate any heteroskedasticity problem that might otherwise appear in the whole
sample. Given that there is no serious heteroskedasticity problem, the OLS is the best
estimator and not the GLS. Our preliminary estimation shows that GLS results are
inconsistent and produce weaker results compared to those of OLS.
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 display OLS results of fixed effects model for the tax
credit panel and tax exemption pool, respectively. Table 2.3 provides some support for
our previous hypothesis that tax credit countries are less responsive to the U.S. corporate
tax rate changes. None of the host country tax coefficients are statistically significant for
the tax credit panel implying that foreign investors are more concerned about the home
country taxes than about the U.S. corporate tax rate. lbis is understandable because
investors can deduct corporate taxes they paid in the host country when calculate home
country corporate tax liability.
Unlike on credit group, statutory tax rate exerts a significantly negative effect on
investors from tax exemption countries. As Table 2.4 illustrates, if the U.S. statutory
corporate income tax rate decreases by 1 percent, then FDI inflows from tax exemption
countries would go up by 1.9 percent. Investors from exemption countries have no
corporate tax obligations in their home country. Therefore, it should not be surprising to
find that they are very sensitive to the host country tax rate. Host country tax coefficients
are not only significant, but also are larger in magnitude than those for the tax credit
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Table 2.3
Fixed Effects Specification OLS Results: Credit Countries
Variable

Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

Statutory Tax Rate

Effective Average
Tax Rate

Host Tax

-0.867

0.320

-1.512

Home Tax

(l.005)
-0.516

(l.178)
0.931 8

(l.379)
-0.783

(0.653)
-8.9148
(2.955)

(0.261)
-10.2698

(0.882)
-9.471 8

(2.857)
3.903

(3.089)
1.251

(3.597)
2.2458

(4.029)
1.790b

-1.366

(0.694)
-0.144

(0.738)
-0.419

(L973)

(l.886)

(2.090)

0.471

0.400

0.505

(0.401)

(0.410)

-0.175

(0.450)
-0.254

0.013

(0.449)

(0.447)

(0.510)

0.662

0.662

0.625

ULC
RGDP

0.240
(3.882 )

BITR

1.846b
(0.722)

TPLUS
INT

EXR
Adjusted R2

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
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Table 2.4
Fixed Effects Specification OLS Results: Exemption Countries
Variable

Statutory Tax Rate

Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

Effective Average
Tax Rate

Host Tax

-l.911c

1.599

-1.816

Home Tax

(0.966)
0.513

(l.265)
0.402

(1.157)
0.582

ULC

(0.712)
-6.9508

(0.326)
-8.2988

0.623)
-6.7878

RGDP

(2.384)
7.542b

(2.323)
7.795 8

(2.049)
8
7.141

(3.063)

(2.654)

0.417

(2.231)
0.548

0.492

(0.392)
5.3068

(0.367)
5.6188

(0.398)
5.2268

(1.229)

(1.303)

-0.209

-0.567

(1.240)
-0.194

(0.297)
-0.440

(0.372)
-1.0288

(0.294)

(0.384)

(0.356)

0.563

0.559

(0.350)
0.561

BITR
TPLUS
INT

EXR
Adjusted R2

-0.564

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
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group. To illustrate, statutory corporate tax rate elasticity is a little more than twice the
size for the exemption group than the one for the credit group.
Finally, we discuss whether home country taxes could affect differently on tax
credit countries and exemption countries. As previously stated, we expect a negative
response from credit countries and no response from exemption countries. Table 2.4
shows that none of the tax coefficient is statistically significant suggesting that exemption
countries in fact are not sensitive to their home country tax rate changes. Since they have
no tax obligations in home country, there should be no reason to be concerned about
home country tax policy changes.
Results for the tax credit countries are rather ambiguous. We hypothesized a
significantly negative coefficient on home country tax rate for the credit panel. Although
effective marginal tax rate elasticity is statistically significant at the 1- percent level,
positive sign contradicts theoretical intuition. On the other hand, statutory tax rate and
effective average tax rate has the expected negative sign, but both of them are statistically
insignificant. There are several reasons that might have accounted for this ambiguity.
One reason is that a tax credit system contains a lot of complications compared to
an exemption system For instance, some countries such as the U.S. and Japan allow
deferring any home country tax liability until they are repatriated in the form of
dividends. The possibility of indefinite deferring can tum a credit country to an
exemption country.
Another complication arises if a home country reduces its corporate income tax
rate such that the tax position of its investors changes from excess tax credit to deficit
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credit situation. To illustrate, the U.K. has reduced its top corporate tax rates several
times transforming practically it into an exemption country rather than a credit country.
By 2000, the top corporate income tax rate in the United Kingdom had dropped to 30
percent. Although the U.K. still remains as a credit country, its residents who invest in
the U.S. currently have no home country tax obligations. The reason is that they are now
in deficit credit situation since current US tax rate is higher than the home country tax
rate.
There is one more factor that could determine this relationship. As extensively
detailed in the first essay, total FDI can be separated into reinvested funds and transfer
funds. As far as reinvested funds are concerned, home country tax rates are not an
immediate concern. Trai:isfer funds, on the other hand, should be more responsive to
home country taxes. What we have is the combine effect. Since we are using aggregate
data, it is not possible to separate out the two effects.
Conclusions

In this essay we use a panel of nine capital-exporting countries to investigate the
impacts of corporate income taxes on foreign direct investment in the United States. In
contrast to previous studies, host country and home country tax rates are explicitly
accounted for. Various measures of corporate tax rates are used and different methods of
pool estimations are estimated. Empirical results presented in this paper lead to the
following conclusions.
First, the U.S. corporate income tax rate exerts a significantly negative impact on
inbound FDI of the United States. This finding is generally consistent with different pool
specifications as well as different tax rates used in the model. However, results are more
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robust for statutory tax rates than for effective rates. Investors probably know about host
country statutory tax rates better than effective rates, so this finding is not surprising. A
heteroskedasticity corrected fixed effects model finds an approximately unitary elasticity
for the statutory tax rate, which suggests that a one percent increase in the U.S. corporate
income tax rate would decrease FDI inflows by one percent. ·conversely, the home
country tax rate shares a positive association with FDI inflows. The coefficient for the
home country tax rate is inelastic for every tax rate specification, which implies that the
U.S. should not expect considerable amount ofFDI inflows in an event of a tax increase
in a capital exporting country.
Second, host country tax rate elasticities for exemption countries are
systematically different from those of credit countries. This finding suggests that
investors from exemption countries are more responsive to taxes than are those from
credit countries. Compared to whole panel, the host country tax elasticity is larger in
absolute value for exemption countries than for credit countries. However, the two
groups are not systematically different in their response to changes in home country tax
rates. For example, we hypothesized a zero or very small response from tax exemption
countries and a stronger negative response from credit countries. Though results for
exemption countries are in line with our expectation, inconsistency is highly visible for
the case of tax credit countries. Complexities in the credit system such as tax deferral and
excess foreign tax credit may have caused this anomaly.
Third, even though this study strongly suggests that the corporate tax rate is an
important determinant of FDI in the United States, we should not underestimate the role
of other non-tax detenninants. We find that non-tax determinants such as market size,
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labor costs, bilateral trade and exchange rate consistently exert statistically significant
impact on FDI inflows of the United States. Therefore, this study emphasizes the
importance of a combination of fiscal and macro economic policy to stimulate FDI
inflows of the United States.
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Appendix A

Variable
FDI (Millions of$)
Host Average Tax
Home Average Tax
Host Marginal Tax
Home Marginal Tax
Host Statutory Tax
Home Statutory Tax
Relative GDP (in 1996 $)
Unit Labor Costs
Telephone Linell 000
Prime Interest Rate
Bilateral Trade (Mil. of $)
Exchange Rate

Table A 2.1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
9826.33
34.26
37.48
23.05
27.30
41.57
44.20
7.81
95.06
559.57
9.16
59285.64
17.48
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Standard Deviation
13137.87
3.23
8.25
1.05
8.65
5.06
9.06
7.83
3.82
67.70
1.98
72573.74
49.67

Appendix B

Table B 2.1
Constant Coefficient Specification: OLS Results
Variable

Statutory Tax
Rate

Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

Effective Average
Tax Rate

Constant

31.8248

25.029b

27.037b

Host Tax

(11.407)
-l.245c

(11.915)
1.095

(10.523)
-1.548

(0.733)

(1.232)
0.296

(0.998)
-0.428

(0.252)

(0.296)

-9.729

-9.6618

(2.401)
-0.038
(0.247)

(2.234)
-0.138

0.295

0.2708

(0.434)

(0.061)

(0.798)

8

8

4.350

3.2918

(0.803)

(0.698)

(0.836)

-0.019

-0.237

0.057

(0.337)

(0.388)

(0.338)

0.031
(0.035)

-0.018

0.032

(0.041)

(0.036)

0.383

0.375

0.376

c

Home tax

-0.591

(0.326)
8

ULC

-10.533

RGDP

(2.346)
-0.179
(0.326)

BITR

1.637

TPLUS

3.269

INT

EXR
2

Adjusted R

8

(0.244)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
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Table B 2.2
Fixed Effects Specification: OLS Results
Variable

Statutory Tax
Rate

Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

Effective Average
Tax Rate

Host Tax

-l.696b

1.049

-l.887b

(0.691)

(0.909)

(0.893)

8

Home Tax

-0.017

0.630

ULC

(0.391)
-8.4448

(0.181)
-9.2148

(0.396)
-8.0268

(1.852)

(1.698)

RGDP

(l.726)
4.776b

4.973b

4.105

(2.319)

(1.995)
0.863b

(2.187)
(0.393)

(1.213)

(0.397)
8
3.981
(1.299)

INT

0.015

-0.195

0.084

(0.294)

EXR

(0.249)
-0.232

-0.635

(0.249)
-0.224

(0.310)

(0.279)

(0.290)

0.593

0.605

0.594

c

BITR

0.714

TPLUS

(0.388)
8
3.228

Adjusted R

2

b

-0.548

c

0.754c

3.3668
(1.215)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
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Table B 2.3
Random Effects Specification: GLS Results
Variable

Statutory Tax
Rate

Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

Effective
Average Tax
Rate

Constant

21.083 b
(10.337)

20.598 b

18.682

·(10.200)

C

Host Tax

-1.423
(0.741)

(9.371)
0.687
(1.020)

Horne Tax

0.169

0.485

0.576

(0.462)

(0.854)

(0.468)

-9.239 8

-8.576 8

-8.996 8

(l.764)

(l.625)

1.980
(1.516)

0.747
(1.222)

(1.718)
1.837 8

0.610 b

0.642 8

0.642

(0.266)

(0.235)

(0.265)

3.134 8

3.263

8

3.316 8

(0.930)

(0.948)

INT

*
*

(0.839)

EXR

-0.050

-0.106

-0.088

(0.201)

(0.165)

(0.201)

0.605

0.596

0.607

C

ULC
RGDP
BITR
TPLUS

2

Adjusted R

*
*

C

-1.585
(0.950)

(1.505)
8 -.'

*
*

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
Interest Rate is dropped from random effects model because it is required that
the number of cross sections are higher than the number of parameters in the
equation.
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Table B 2.4
Constant Coefficient Specification OLS Results: Credit Countries
Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

Effective Average
Tax Rate

8

62.3248

54.882

(14.082)

(15.152)

(15.335)

0.434 C

-0.758

0.460

(1.035)

(l.512)

(1.592)

b

c

Variable

Statutory Tax
Rate

Constant

51.285

Host Tax
Home Tax

-l.396

0.556

(0.582)
8

8

-0.719
(0.687)

(0.313)
-13.4948

-10.775 8

ULC

-10.406

RGDP

(3.041)
-3.128b

(3.380)
-3.5108

(3.321)
-3.546b

(1.548)

(1.232)

(l.629)

1.734 8

2.118

1.898

(0.315)

(0.258)

(0.369)

-1.763

-1.809

-2.159

(1.295)

(1.471)

(1.396)

0.517

0.702

0.517

(0.428)

(0.492)

(0.430)

-0.4368

-0.683

-0.5158

(0.134)

(0.107)

(0.163)

0.603

0.600

0.585

BlTR
TPLUS
INT
EXR
Adjusted R2

8

8

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
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Table B 2.5
I

Constant Coefficient Specification GLS Results: Credit Countries
Variable

Statutory Tax
Rate

Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

Effective
Average Tax
Rate

Constant

40.522a

50.499a

42.731a

(13.022)
-0.286

(11.710)

Host Tax

(11.271)
0.200
(0.889)

Home Tax
ULC
RGDP
BITR
TPLUS
INT
EXR
Adjusted R2

-1.352

b

(1.206)

0.056
(l.241)

0.382

-0.829

(0.512)

(0.235)

a

a

-9.506

(0.540)
-6.721b

(2.414)

(2.920)

(2,619)

-2.907c

-3.191b

-3.141b

(1.481)

(1.211)

(1.479)

1.766a

2.122a

1.874a

(0.226)

(0.216)

(0.259)

-2.992 a

-2.888a

-3.390a

(0.783)

(1.051)

(0.893)

0.644c

0.897b

0.746b

(0.364)

(0.388)

-0.436a

-0.648a

(0.353)
-0.485a

(0.099)

(0.094)

(0.115)

0.947

0.947

0.952

-6.574

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
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Table B 2.6
Fixed Effects Specification GLS Results: Credit Countries
Variable

Statutory Tax
Rate

Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

Effective Average
Tax Rate

Host Tax

-1.032

0.383

-1.619

(0.809)

(0.818)

(1.050)

a

Home Tax

-0.655

0.601

(0.189)

ULC

(0.548)
-5.076b

RGDP

(2.327)
0.788

BITR

0.319

-6.149

0.640)
-5.289b

(3.972)

(2.505)
3.754
(2.836)

(2.493)
1.866
(4.175)

2.058a

1.833a

2.011a

(0.539)

(0.482)
0.470

(0.558)

b

-2.397c

TPLUS

-3.133a

(1.150)

(1.249)

INT

(1.169)
0.643b

0.459

0.749b

(0.319)

(0.297)

EXR

-0.019

-0.477

(0.312)
-0.192

(0.293)

(0.378)

Adjusted R2

(0.326)
0.961

0.963

0.962

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
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Table B 2.7
Fixed Effects Specification GLS Results: Exemption Countries
Variable

Statutory Tax
Rate

Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

Effective
Average Tax
Rate

Host Tax

-0.826

1.004

-0.391

(0.624)

(0.771)
0.363c
(0.211)
-7.5828

(0.782)
0.886b

Home Tax
ULC

0.904c
(0.495)
-5.3878
(1.524)

RGDP
BITR
TPLUS
INT
EXR
Adjusted R 2

(0.433)
-5.8668

(1.498)
7.2278

(1.409)

(2.223)

(1.539)

(1.888)

c

b

5.229

b

5.2698

1.038

1.119

(0.551)

(0.515)

1.121b
(0.556)

b

3.584

3.689b

3.600b

(1.741)

(1.729)

(1.737)

-0.258

-0.585

b

-0.341

(0.227)

(0.239)

(0.223)
-0.613b

8

-0.399

-1.001

(0.275)

(0.245)

0.965

0.968

(0.243)
0.965

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
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Table B 2.8
Constant Coefficient Specification OLS Results: Exem otion Countries
Variable

Statutory Tax
Rate

Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

Effective Average
Tax Rate

Constant

31.342 a

35.926 a

29.541 a

(9.930)

(12.166)

(9.142)

-0.720

1.152

-0.581

(0.813)

(0.995)
0.188

Host Tax
Home Tax

0.188

(1.393)
0.217

ULC

(0.301)
-ll.583 a

(0.218)
-12.307 a

(0.280)
-11.316 a

RGDP

(2.034)
-0.190

(2.276)
-0.124

(1.913)
-0.174

(0.397)

(0.404)

(0.399)

0.133 b

0.149 a

0.139 b

(0.052)

(0.051)

a

a

(0.052)
4.736 a

BITR
TPLUS

4.649

(0.657)

(0.735)

INT

(0.708)
-0.385

-0.589

-0.382

(0.431)

EXR

(0.365)
-0.683

-0.813

(0.366)
-0.729

(0.519)

(0.470)

(0.503)

0.488

0.492

0.486

Adjusted R

2

4.869

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
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Table B 2.9
Constant Coefficient Specification GLS Results: Exemption Countries
Variable

Statutory Tax
Rate

Effective Marginal
Tax Rate

Effective
Average Tax
Rate

Constant

16.853 a

25.526 a

18.535 b

(7.592)
0.119

(5.628)

Host Tax

(6.023)
-0.082 b

Home Tax

(0.513)
0.460b

(0.976)
0.198

(0.255)

(0.156)

0.193
(0.643)
0.370c
(0.221)
a

ULC

-8.998

a

-10.660
(1.504)

RGDP

(1.333)
-0.283

-0.227

(1.265)
-0.259

(0.292)

(0.302)
0.165 a

(0.285)
0.167 a

a

-9.384 a

BITR

0.161

(0.038)

TPLUS

(0.037)
5.195 a

5.072 a

(0.038)
5.255 a

(0.516)

(0.506)

(0.530)

INT

-0.466b

-0.590b

0.518

(0.255)

EXR

(0.257)
-0.611

(0.254)
-0.703

-0.801b

(0.384)
Adjusted R2

(0.335)
0.955

0.960

(0.352)
0.958

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are in natural logs.
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